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Experiments on Confidence Calibration and 
Decision Making  
Abstract 
This thesis reports on three experiments studying subjects' confidence about 
performance on a task and how it relates to decision-making under uncertainty. 
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis providing an overview of the common themes 
and methods underlying this research. 
Chapter 2 reports the first experiment, investigating the relationship 
between risk attitudes and confidence judgements. We measure confidence in 
two different ways, with an incentivized elicitation tool and with unincentivized 
self-reports. Using our incentivised tool we find that, in the absence of controls 
for risk attitudes, subjects tend to be underconfident about their own 
performance. When we filter out the effects of risk attitudes we find that 
underconfidence is reduced, but not eliminated.  We also identify an interesting 
link between self-reported confidence and risk attitudes in that experimental 
subjects with less concave utility functions and more elevated probability 
weighting functions tend to report higher confidence levels. 
Chapter 3 reports the second experiment, investigating the role of 
information in experimental market entry games. We look at whether individual 
over-entry to simple and under-entry to difficult markets disappears when 
subjects make entry decisions in groups or are given statistical information 
about performance of previous subjects. We find that individuals and groups are 
both susceptible to the same type of biases in entry and both fail to learn from 
repetition and feedback. We find that individuals learn to de-bias their entry 
  
II 
 
decisions in the second half of the experiment when given explicit information 
about the performance of others.  
Chapter 4 reports an experiment investigating "snowballing of 
confidence" in hierarchical tournaments. We analyse how high/low scorers of a 
group in one stage of the tournament change their confidence levels in the next 
stage when they are re-grouped with other high/low scorers. We find that all 
subjects start the tournament assigning an equal chance to being high or low 
scorers in their groups. As they proceed through the stages, low scorers become 
more underconfident whereas high scorers become more overconfident about 
their relative performances. We also identify an interesting difference in the 
perceptions of the task between high and low scorers that is linked to self-
serving causal attribution biases previously found in the psychology literature.  
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of this dissertation and concludes. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is a collection of three papers (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) reporting studies 
that contribute to different research areas in the field of behavioural and 
experimental economics. While each paper is self-contained and can be read 
independently from the others, there is a common theme of confidence 
judgements underlying the research questions examined in these studies, as well 
as commonalities in the methodology and research strategies used to address 
these questions.  
The research questions in the three papers of this thesis are inspired by 
considerations about the importance of confidence judgements for 
understanding the outcomes of economic decisions and interactions among 
individuals. While standard economic theory relies on the simplifying 
assumptions that all economic agents are perfectly aware of their skills, abilities 
and relative standings in the distribution of other agents, there is a large body of 
evidence gathered through survey and experimental studies that shows that 
people make systematic mistakes in judging their absolute and relative skill 
levels. The literature in confidence judgements is divided into two main strands 
that study either absolute confidence or relative confidence. Absolute 
confidence LVWKHMXGJHPHQWRIRQH¶VRZQSHUIRUPDQFHLQGHSHQGHQWRIRWKHUV¶
performances whereas relative confidence is the judgement of RQH¶V
performance relative to that of others.  
The early studies on absolute confidence judgements (e.g. Fischoff, 
Slovic & Lichtenstein 1977; Lichtenstein & Fischoff 1981; Lichtenstein, 
Fischoff & Phillips, 1980) mostly find overconfidence or a ³KDUG-HDV\´HIIHFW
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(overestimation of performance in hard tasks, and underestimation of 
performance in easy tasks). The robustness of the findings has been 
subsequently challenged by, for example Suantak, Bolger, & Ferrel (1996) for 
response scale effect, by Gigerenzer, Hoffrage & Keinbolting (1991) for 
frequentist versus probabilistic belief elicitation and by Erev, Wallstein, & 
Budescu (1994) for possible asymmetries in random error in judgement. 
Irrespective of the source of a systematic miscalibration of confidence from 
actual performance, it is still the case that the miscalibration can have important 
effects on economic decisions such as job search, bargaining behaviour, 
investment decisions and trading behaviour (Dubra 2004; Biais, Hilton, 
Mazuier & Pouget 2005; Dickinson 2006). Most of the studies measuring 
absolute confidence calibration have used a number of elicitation devices to 
elicit confidence levels and measure calibration between confidence and 
performance. They report that with incentives confidence levels are lower than 
without and overcconfidence may be a product of incentivized elicitation 
procedures (Blavatskyy 2009; Clark & Friesen 2009; Urbig, Stauf & Weitzel 
2009; Hollard, Massoni & Vergnaud 2010).  
The second chapterHQWLWOHG³+RZ'o Risk Attitudes Affect Measured 
&RQILGHQFH"´, uses a laboratory experiment to study how absolute confidence 
is affected by individual risk attitudes. Specifically, we study how risk attitudes 
(attitudes to consequences and to probabilities) contaminate elicited confidence 
with incentivized elicitation tools and how we can filter out risk attitudes and 
infer de-contaminated confidence. We also study whether confidence elicited 
through non-incentivized self-reports correlates with individual risk attitudes, 
to explore whether there is an intrinsic relationship between confidence and risk 
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preferences measurable at the individual level. We design our experiment with 
two between-subject treatments to address both of our research questions. In our 
unincentivized self-reported confidence treatment, we replicate the standard 
ILQGLQJLQWKHSV\FKRORJ\OLWHUDWXUHRI³KDUG-HDV\´HIIHFW± overestimation of 
success rate in hard and underestimation of success rate in easy tasks. We find 
that risk attitudes bias confidence downwards in the incentivized confidence 
treatment and filtering out risk attitudes decreases observed underconfidence 
and brings average confidence closer to well calibration. We find a significant 
relationship between individual risk attitudes and self-reported confidence 
judgements, such that people with more risk seeking utility functions and more 
optimistic probability weighting functions tend to report higher confidence 
levels.  
The third and fourth chapters of the thesis study relative confidence 
judgements. The previous research in relative confidence judgements has found 
that people tend to judge themselves as performing better than average in 
common and/or easy tasks such as driving or completing an easy quiz (Svenson 
1981; Camerer & Lovallo 1999; Moore 2007) and rate themselves as 
performing worse than average in rare and/or difficult tasks such as graduating 
in the top of their grade, computer programming, and unicycle riding 
(Windschitl, Kruger & Simms 2003; Kruger & Burrus 2004; Kruger, 
Windschitl, Burrus, Fessel & Chambers 2008).  
In the third chapter, HQWLWOHG ³7KH 5ROH RI ,PSOLFLW DQG ([SOLFLW
,QIRUPDWLRQLQ(QWU\WR&RPSHWLWLRQV´ we replicate and extend the research of 
Moore & Cain (2007) investigating whether, and if so how, individuals learn to 
avoid coordination failures in entry decisions to experimental markets where 
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their performance in a task decides their final outcome. Their study shows that 
giving subjects full feedback in a repeated market entry game does not help to 
de-bias entry decisions: people over/underenter to markets where a 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶V UDQNLQJ LQ D SULRU HDV\GLIILFXOW WDVN LV D GHWHUPLQDQW RI WKHLU
success in a market compared to a case where there is no performance task. This 
has been shown to be caused by subjects¶ beliefs that they are better than 
average in easy and worse than average in difficult tasks which is not mitigated 
by repetition and feedback. We study whether providing subjects with historical 
average performance information (explicit information) or having subjects 
make decisions in groups (implicit information) will de-bias their relative 
confidence judgements and eliminate coordination failures in entry behaviour 
to experimental markets.  
We use three treatments to answer our research question of how more 
information can help to overcome coordination failures in entering competitive 
experimental markets. In the control treatment, we use the design of Moore & 
Cain (2007) to study the individual entry decisions across 12 rounds of market 
entry game with varying difficulty level tasks. We replicate their finding that 
there is significant overentry to simple and underentry to difficult markets and 
subjects do not learn to coordinate their entry decisions across difficulty levels 
with feedback and repetition. In our explicit information treatment, we give 
subjects average historical performance information at each skill round, so that 
subjects know how previous participants have scored in a given task. In the 
implicit information treatment, we seat subjects in groups of three and ask them 
to make their decisions as a single group unit. Our hypothesis is that groups can 
serve as implicit informational channels about performance of others and help 
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to decrease the coordination failures in entry. We test this hypothesis and study 
differences between groups and individuals in a competitive decision making 
context. This chapter contributes to the literature studying group versus 
individual decision making and beliefs as important determinants of 
competitive decisions. Our results show significant treatment differences in 
both entry decisions and confidence levels of subjects. We find that only explicit 
information is successful in de-ELDVLQJ VXEMHFWV¶ HQWU\ GHFLVLRQV EXW RQO\
combined with feedback and repetition. Groups make significantly better 
MXGJHPHQWV DERXW RWKHUV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH DQG VR GR VHUYH DV LPSOLFLW
informational channels) but fail to incorporate those judgements in their 
behaviour to make better entry decisions.  
In the fourth chapter, ³6QRZEDOOLQJ &RQILGHQFH LQ +LHUDUFKLFDO
7RXUQDPHQWV´ we study snowballing of relative confidence in a context of 
hierarchical tournaments through multiple stages. We introduce a novel 
confidence elicitation device in the context of a skill-based performance task, 
and we use if to track how confidence changes from one stage to another as 
subjects learn about their relative performance in the previous stage and are 
grouped with those similar to them in the new stage. Ours is one of the first 
studies to measure and track confidence in such a multiple stage setting. Our 
elicitation device is incentive compatible under non-EU risk preferences. This 
study is related to the different strands of literature such as tournaments and 
contests (e.g. Dargnies 2012; Ludwig, Wichardt & Wickhorst 2011; Park & 
Santos-Pinto 2010), asymmetric belief updating (e.g. Mobius, Niederle, 
Niehaus & Rosenblat 2011; Eil & Rao 2011; Eberlein, Ludwig & Nafziger 
2011; Grossman & Owens 2012) and differences in relative confidence across 
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simple and difficult tasks (e.g. Moore & Cain 2007; Hoelzl & Rustichini 2005) 
however, is unique as it is the first study explicitly study confidence 
snowballing.   
The results of the fourth chapter show that subjects on average do not 
display any systematic relative confidence bias in the first stage of the 
tournament where on average 50% confidence is assigned to being in the top 
scoring half. In the next stages, we observe significant snowballing of 
confidence, where top scorers are matched with other top scorers increase their 
confidence levels and bottom scorers matched with other bottom scorers 
decrease their confidence levels from one stage to another. Furthermore we find 
VLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWRSDQGERWWRPVFRUHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHWDVN
where top scorers rate the task as a more skill task and bottom scorers rate the 
task as a more luck task which exhibits a bias in attribution of causality to 
successes and failures. 
All of the studies use novel experimental strategies to elicit confidence 
levels. The advantage of using experimental methodology is the control we have 
over the data generating process and the ability to manipulate the contexts we 
want to measure confidence in. There are a number of field studies on 
confidence literature that are very ingenious in their designs and research 
questions. Some early studies for example measure confidence calibration of 
meteorological weather forecasters using the experience of the forecaster and 
the past inaccuracy as proxies for the amount of feedback and repetition 
(Murphy & Daan 1984; Murphy & Winkler 1984). The field studies on relative 
confidence usually lack objective performance measures to study confidence as 
an objective social comparison measure and hence pose a difficulty in 
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interpreting elicited confidence (Svenson 1981; Hoorens & Buunk 1993). A 
recent study by Park & Santos-Pinto (2010) measured relative confidence of 
poker and chess players in national championships by asking them their rank 
forecasts before the start of the tournaments. However due to limitations in the 
structure of the tournaments, they are not able to elicit and track the changes in 
confidence of the tournament winners and losers. Experimental methods are 
especially useful for studying confidence in a tournament setting, since in field 
settings players (winners and especially losers) may be hard to track, self-
selection may play an important role and controlling for the causality and in the 
environment may be more difficult where more than one variable may change 
from one stage to another. In this dissertation, we are able to systematically 
elicit confidence, manipulating both the treatment conditions to check for 
causality and specific features of the decision environment that we are 
specifically interested in with the help of experimental tools. 
The abundance of studies in the psychology literature studying 
confidence both in absolute terms (calibration studies) and relative terms (social 
comparison studies) has definitely attracted attention of economists interested 
in how beliefs shape economic decisions. Little is known about how individual 
risk attitudes are related to confidence judgements or how people update their 
confidence when they move from competing within one reference group to the 
other. The focus of this thesis is to contribute to extending the application of 
confidence research in the discipline of economics and in the domain of 
economically relevant settings where confidence impacts decisions.  
Chapter 5 concludes by summarizing the results of chapters 2 to 5, pointing out 
their limitations and suggesting directions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2: HOW DO RISK ATTITUDES AFFECT 
MEASURED CONFIDENCE? 
 
2.1. Introduction 
A large literature dating back to the 1970s documents systematic biases in 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶FRQILGHQFHDVVHVVPHQWVRIWKHLURZQSHUIRUPDQFH,QWKLVpaper, we 
report an experiment investigating possible relationships between confidence 
miscalibration and risk attitudes.   
 Our study has two primary motivations. The first flows from an apparent 
clash between the established results from the psychological literature and more 
recent evidence emerging from experimental economics. A large volume of 
research in psychology suggests that individuals have predictable tendencies 
towards either overconfidence or a hard-easy effect (over-estimating own 
performance in hard tasks and under-estimating it in easy tasks). By contrast, 
more recent research in experimental economics has found either much less 
confidence miscalibration or, when it occurs, strikingly different patterns of 
miscalibration (we discuss the evidence in more detail in the next section). What 
might account for this difference? One distinctive feature of much of the newer 
literature is that it employs various (financial) incentive mechanisms to motivate 
revelation of confidence, whereas the psychology studies rely on non-
incentivised self-reports of confidence. So, one possible diagnosis is that the 
newer evidence provides more accurate confidence measurement as a 
consequence of incentivised revelation techniques. In this paper, however, we 
investigate another possibility: that some of the differences between findings of 
economists and psychologists may be a consequence of biases in measured 
  
13 
 
confidence induced by incentive mechanisms which fail to control for the 
influence of individual risk attitudes.  
 A second motivation for our study is to explore the possibility that 
confidence judgements may be intrinsically related to risk attitudes. It seems 
intuitively plausible that there could be a positive association between 
individuals being more confident and being more willing to take risks. For 
example, overconfidence about own abilities and a willingness to take risks 
might be common consequences of particular personality traits (e.g. egotism) or 
emotional states or dispositions (e.g. optimism). While these considerations 
suggest a possible linkage between individual confidence assessment and risk 
attitudes, as far as we know, our study is the first to directly test for it. 
 In pursuit of these objectives, we elicit confidence via two distinct 
methods and we also independently measure individual risk attitudes. One of 
our confidence measurement tools is a non-incentivised task designed to be 
analogous to standard procedures that have been used extensively in 
psychological research; the other is a simple incentivised choice based 
procedure. We designed the latter to be incentive compatible for revelation of 
confidence for risk neutral subjects, but, in common with other incentive 
mechanisms that have been used in the recent literature, our procedure will 
result in biased confidence measurements for non-risk neutral subjects. Thus, 
we complement this procedure with a method that uses elicited risk attitudes to 
correct incentivised confidence measures for departures from risk-neutrality. 
Section 2.3 describes our experimental methodology in more detail.  
 In Section 2.4 we present our results. There are three primary findings. 
First, our two tools produce markedly different patterns of confidence 
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miscalibration, mimicking the stylised facts of existing research (the non-
incentivized tool reproduces the familiar hard-easy effect, while our 
incentivised tool reveals general underconfidence). Second, when we filter out 
the effects of risk attitudes on incentivised measurements of confidence, we find 
that measured miscalibration is much reduced. This shows that incentivised 
mechanisms for confidence elicitation can be significantly biased in the absence 
of suitable controls for individual risk preferences. Finally, we find that 
confidence as measured by the standard psychological technique correlates 
significantly with features of individual risk attitudes including parameters of 
individual probability weighting functions. Moreover the directions of 
association are intuitively plausible: for example, reported confidence is 
SRVLWLYHO\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK µRSWLPLVP¶ LQ SUREDELOLW\ ZHLJKWV 6HFWLRQ 2.5 
discusses these results and concludes. 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
There is a large literature in psychology on biases in individual assessments of 
WKHLURZQDELOLWLHVERWKUHODWLYHWRRWKHUV¶DQGLQDEVROXWHWHUPV)LQGLQJVRI
overconfidence in own performance relative to that of others (e.g. Svenson 
1980) has motivated many studies by experimental economists on the 
relationship between relative confidence, relative ability, and willingness to 
take risks in strategic environments (e.g. Camerer & Lovallo 1999; Hoelzl & 
Rustichini 2005; Moore & Cain 2007; Niederle & Vesterlund 2007). In our 
study, we focus on the calibration of own absolute performance. This is the 
more suitable measure given our purpose of studying the relationship between 
confidence judgements and risk attitudes since both are in the domain of 
individual choice.  By contrast, miscalibration of relative performance may 
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reflect miscalibration of own performance, or of the performance of others, and 
its measurement may be complicated by strategic and/or social comparison 
concerns. 
Early studLHVE\SV\FKRORJLVWVRQLQGLYLGXDOV¶VHOI-assessment of own 
performance document systematic miscalibration, usually towards 
overconfidence or a hard-easy effect (Fischoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein 1977; 
Lichtenstein & Fischoff 1981; Lichtenstein, Fischoff & Phillips, 1982; see 
Keren 1991 or Alba & Hutchinson 2000 for a review). In a typical study (e.g. 
Fischoff et al. 1977), individuals are given quiz questions and asked to give an 
answer and an assessment of the chances of their answer being correct. A 
common finding is that on questions where, say, 90% of individuals get the 
correct answer, average confidence is substantially lower, whereas in questions 
where, say, 60% get the correct answer, average confidence is substantially 
higher. A variety of explanations for these findings have been given including, 
response scale effects, stochastic errors in decision making or regression 
towards the mean (Erev, Wallstein & Budescu 1994; Suantak, Bolger & Ferrel 
1996; Juslin, Winman & Olsson 2000; Brenner 2000).  
Regardless of the source of confidence miscalibration, it has important 
implications from an economics perspective: confidence about own abilities 
affect many important economic decisions such as trading behaviour (Biais, 
Hilton, Mazuier & Pouget 2005), job search (Dubra 2004), investment in 
education (Dunning, Heath & Suls 2004) and bargaining behaviour in binding 
arbitration (Dickinson 2006). Thus it is not surprising that economists have 
begun to incorporate overconfidence into economic models (Compte & 
Postlewaite 2004; Gervais, Heaton & Odean 2011, Herz, Schunk & Zehnder 
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2014). But, recent research by experimental economists on miscalibration of 
(absolute) own confidence has revealed rather different patterns to the earlier 
psychology literature.  
One of the first papers in the experimental economics literature using 
incentivized elicitation tools to study absolute confidence calibration is 
Blavatskyy (2009). He has subjects answer a set of 10 multiple choice quiz 
questions after which they choose from two payment schemes. Either one 
question is selected at random and the subject receives a payoff if he or she has 
answered this question correctly, or the subject receives the same payoff with a 
stated probability set by the experimenter to be equal to the percentage of 
correctly answered questions (although the subject does not know this is how 
the probability is set). Subjects could also indicate indifference. He finds that 
the majority chose the second payment scheme, which he interprets as 
underconfidence. Blavatskyy also elicited risk attitudes in a separate part of the 
experiment and found no significant relationship between elicited risk attitudes 
and choices of payment scheme.  In a related contribution, Urbig, Stauf & 
Weitzel (2009) elicit confidence about own performance over a set of 10 
multiple choice quiz questions. They find the majority of subjects are well-
calibrated. Both of these studies note the difference between their findings and 
those from the earlier psychology literature, and speculate that the difference 
may be due to the introduction of financial incentives. However, both studies 
lack a benchmark treatment for comparing the elicited confidence with an 
unincentivized tool. Our study includes such a comparison. 
Clark & Friesen (2009) study sXEMHFWV¶ FRQILGHQFH LQ UHODWLRQ WR WZR
types of real effort task involving verbal and numerical skills. They study 
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calibration over a set of tasks elicited through unincentivized self-reports or 
quadratic scoring rule (QSR) incentives. They find underconfidence more 
prevalent than overconfidence and find better calibration with incentives. 
Moreover, they find that underconfidence was greatest among those using 
greater effort. One potential limitation of their analysis is that, unless subjects 
are risk neutral, QSR may result in biased measurements of confidence (we 
return to this point below in more detail).   
A potentially significant feature of all three of the experiments discussed 
in the last two paragraphs is that they elicit confidence in relation to 
performance across sets of tasks.  By contrast, much of the earlier psychological 
literature investigating confidence calibration assessed it with reference to 
performance in single tasks. This may be a significant distinction because there 
is evidence that miscalibration varies between measurements based on single 
versus sets of tasks. For example, Gigerenzer, Hoffrage & Keinbolting (1991), 
Liberman (2004) and Griffin & Brenner (2008) report that when beliefs are 
elicited about aggregate performance in sets of tasks most subjects are either 
well-calibrated or underconfident whereas overconfidence is evident when 
elicitation is at the single task level. We study confidence on a single task level. 
Hence our evidence is more directly comparable with the original confidence 
calibration studies. 
The two studies most closely related to ours are Offerman, Sonnemans, 
van de Kuilen & Wakker (2009) and Hollard, Massoni & Vergnaud (2010). 
Hollard et al. (2010) elicit absolute confidence on a disaggregate task-level and 
compare confidence in visual perception and quiz tasks comparing three 
elicitation tools: unincentivized self-reports; the QSR; and the Becker-deGroot-
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Marschak (BDM) mechanism. They find highest overconfidence in the 
unincentivized self-reports followed by BDM and then QSR. That BDM-
elicited confidence is higher than QSR-elicited confidence is consistent with the 
effects of risk aversion, but since they do not elicit risk attitudes it is not possible 
to say whether the difference between these elicitation tools is caused by risk 
attitudes or something else, such as differences in understanding of the 
elicitation procedures. Offerman et al. (2009) study biases in additivity of 
elicited beliefs relative to two mutually exclusive events whose occurrence is 
determined by nature. They hypothesize that the additivity bias in elicited 
beliefs arises because of the effect of risk attitudes on (QSR) elicited beliefs. In 
a two-VWHS SURFHVV WKH\ HOLFLW VXEMHFWV¶ EHOLHIV DERXW XQFHUWDLQ HYHQWV XVLQJ
QSR, and then use estimates of risk attitudes to filter out the effect of risk 
attitudes on measured beliefs. They find that the frequency of biases slightly 
decreases. 
Our research strategy shares some features in common with Offerman 
et al., in particular that we explicitly estimate risk attitude parameters to filter 
out risk attitudes from beliefs. The key difference is that we are concerned with 
biases in subjective estimates of confidence in own performance (not biases in 
assessments of naturally determined chance events).1 We use an elicitation tool 
for inferring confidence from incentivised choice behaviour that will be affected 
by risk attitudes if subjects are not risk neutral. By explicitly measuring risk 
attitudes we are able to observe the effect of risk attitudes on elicited beliefs 
and, more importantly, filter out risk attitudes and obtain risk-attitude-adjusted 
                                                          
1
 Another difference from Offerman et al. is that we use the method developed by Fehr-Duda, 
Gennaro & Schubert (2006) to estimate individual risk parameters under the two leading models 
of decision under risk ± expected utility (EU) and rank-dependant utility (RDU) theories. 
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measures of confidence. By comparing risk adjusted to unadjusted confidence, 
we will be able to track an effect of risk attitudes on elicited confidence.  
By explicitly measuring risk attitudes we are also able to investigate how 
those attitudes correlate with self-reported confidence. Previous studies 
investigating the link between individual characteristics and confidence have 
mostly focused on gender differences and find that women are less confident 
than men in relative terms but not in absolute terms (Clark & Friesen 2009; 
Biais et al. 2005; Lundeberg, Fox, Brown & Elbedour 2000). Campbell, Goodie 
& Foster (2004) find that narcissism predicts higher self-reported confidence 
DQG PRUH ZLOOLQJQHVV WR EHW RQ RQH¶V RZQ SHUIRUPDQFHV 0RUH UHFHQWO\
economists have become interested in how personality traits and economic 
preferences interact. It has been found that personality traits such as openness 
and extraversion predict confidence and overconfidence respectively (Schaefer, 
Williams, Goodie & Campbell 2004), neuroticism and cognitive ability predict 
risk taking (Rustichini, DeYoung, Anderson & Burks 2012), and personality 
traits complemented by risk preferences are successful in predicting many life 
outcomes such as health, earnings and education (Becker, Deckers, Dohmen, 
Falk & Kosse 2012). None of these studies, however, report how risk attitudes 
are correlated with elicited confidence at the individual level. Our methodology 
allows us to study the connection between risk attitudes and confidence directly 
and, conditional on there being some correlation, we will be able to probe how 
different components of risk attitude (i.e. curvature of utility or probability 
weighting) contribute towards it. 
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2.3. Methods 
We measure confidence about own performance in the context of a standard 
quiz framework. A subject responds to a series of two-item multiple-choice 
questions and, for each one, we elicit her subjective probability that her answer 
is correct. As a benchmark treatment we elicit confidence using self-reported 
non-incentivised confidence assessments. In another treatment we infer 
confidence from responses to a new incentivised procedure that employs 
pairwise choices between bets on own performance and certain amounts of 
money.  
In both treatments we also estimate individual risk attitudes from a 
sequence of binary lottery choices. We use these estimates to filter out the 
effects of risk attitudes on elicited confidence in our incentivized procedure and 
to study the relationship between individual confidence and risk attitude. 
  
2.3.1. Inferring Confidence and Eliciting Risk Preferences 
We measure confidence about one's own performance using a multiple price list 
format. 2 Across a series of tasks, subjects have to say which of two cities has 
the higher population and then complete a table as in Figure 1.  
Given the construction of the table, subjects are expected to choose 
Option B in the first row and Option A in the last row. At some point they will 
likely switch from option B to A, and this switchpoint is used to measure their 
confidence in their answer. For example, suppose a subject thinks she has a 67% 
chance of being correct.  Her expected earnings from option A are £6.70 and so 
                                                          
2
 Andersen, Harrison, Lau & Rutstrom (2006) and Isoni, Loomes & Sugden (2011) extensively 
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using multiple price list (MPL) elicitation tools. 
We choose to use MPL mainly because of the clear interpretable framework of the decision 
environment (the value of betting on own answer) and the relative ease for subjects to see that 
truthful revelation is in their best interest. 
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if she wants to maximise her expected earnings she should switch from B to A 
at row 8. We will refer to these switchpoints as certainty equivalents (CE) and 
under expected value maximisation (EV) the CE can be interpreted as revealing 
an indivLGXDO¶VVXEMHFWLYHSUREDELOLW\RIVXFFHVVr 2.5%).  
 
Which of the following cities has the larger population? 
Ƒ&LW\;  Ƒ&LW\< 
Tick one of the boxes to indicate your answer. 
 
In each row of the table choose either Option A or B. 
Row Option A:  Lottery 
Your Choice Option B:  
Guaranteed Amount A B 
1 
You get £10.00 if 
your city choice is 
correct and £0.00 if 
not 
 
Ƒ Ƒ £10.00 
2 Ƒ Ƒ £9.50 
3 Ƒ Ƒ £9.00 
4 Ƒ Ƒ £8.50 
5 Ƒ Ƒ £8.00 
6 Ƒ Ƒ £7.50 
7 Ƒ Ƒ £7.00 
8 Ƒ Ƒ £6.50 
9 Ƒ Ƒ £6.00 
10 Ƒ Ƒ £5.50 
11 Ƒ Ƒ £5.00 
12 Ƒ Ƒ £4.50 
13 Ƒ Ƒ £4.00 
14 Ƒ Ƒ £3.50 
15 Ƒ Ƒ £3.00 
16 Ƒ Ƒ £2.50 
17 Ƒ Ƒ £2.00 
18 Ƒ Ƒ £1.50 
19 Ƒ Ƒ £1.00 
20 Ƒ Ƒ £0.50 
Figure 1: Our Confidence Elicitation Tool 
 
More generally, the CE picks up some mix of assessment of their 
chances of success with (possibly several) aspects of risk attitudes including 
non-linear attitudes to consequences and probabilities. For example, if the 
subject is a risk averse expected utility maximiser she will switch at a later row. 
If we were to incorrectly assume that this subject makes choices according to 
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the EV model, we would interpret this later switchpoint as indicating a low 
subjective probability of success. In this case our estimate of subject confidence 
would be biased and, even if the individual is perfectly calibrated in that her 
subjective probability accurately reflects her underlying performance, we would 
find systematic underconfidence. Similarly, if choices are made based on non-
linear attitudes to probabilities, we would obtain biased measures of confidence 
if we were to infer confidence through the lens of a model that fails to 
incorporate these attitudes, and as a result we would attribute systematic 
miscalibration to well-calibrated subjects.  
To allow for non-linear attitudes to consequences and/or probabilities 
ZHLQIHUFRQILGHQFHIURP&(¶VXVLQJWKHWZRPRVWFRPPRQVSHFLILFDWLRQVIRU
risk preferences: Expected Utility (EU) and Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) 
theories. For both theories, there should be a unique switchpoint at which the 
utility of the certainty equivalent will be (approximately) equal to the utility of 
the lottery.3 Hence, under the RDU model (which contains EU and EV as special 
cases) we may write: 
 ܷሺܥܧ௜ሻ ൌ ܷሺ ? ? ?ሻݓሺܥ݋݊ ௜݂ሻ ൅ ܷሺ ? ?ሻ൫ ? െ ݓሺܥ݋݊ ௜݂ሻ൯   (1) 
 
where CEi LVDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VFHUWDLQW\HTXLYDOHQWIRUTXHVWLRQi, U(.) is a value 
function defined on money payoffs and w(.) is an RDU probability weighting 
function. In expression (1) we treat confidence as a subjective probability 
judgement that underlies choices, but may be prone to misperceptions. In our 
analysis here, these misperceptions are equivalent to confidence miscalibration. 
                                                          
3
 For compactness, the discussion now proceeds as if CE is revealed accurately by our procedure 
but the reader should keep in mind that there is, of course, an element of approximation.  
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The function w(.) is then interpreted as capturing attitudes to chance distinct 
from misperceptions.4  Rearranging equation (1) we obtain the probability that 
a subject assigns to being correct in question i,ܥ݋݊ ௜݂ǡ as: 
 ܥ݋݊ ௜݂ ൌ ݓିଵ ቀ௎ሺ஼ா೔ሻି௎ሺ ?଴ሻ௎ሺ ?ଵ଴ሻି௎ሺ ?଴ሻቁ     (2) 
 
Under the EV model both the value function and the probability weighting 
function are linear so confidence can be inferred directly from an observed CE 
as Confi = CEi/10. Estimation of confidence under the EU model requires 
knowledge of the value (utility) function while estimation under the RDU model 
requires knowledge of both the value function and the probability weighting 
function. 
For the purpose of estimating ܷሺǤ ሻ and ݓሺǤ ሻ, we use a simple and easy 
to understand procedure introduced in Fehr-Duda, Gennaro & Schubert (2006) 
and successfully employed to estimate value function and probability weighting 
function parameters in several subsequent  studies (including: Bruhin, Fehr-
Duda & Epper 2010; Fehr-Duda, Bruhin, Epper & Schubert 2010; and Epper, 
Fehr-Duda & Bruhin 2011). Because it uses a multiple price list elicitation task 
which is very similar in structure to our confidence elicitation task, it is 
particularly well suited to our study as its use minimises the cognitive load 
involved in subjects learning how to respond to the two types of task.  
 
 
                                                          
4
 In the literature on prospect theory, probability weights are sometimes interpreted as reflecting 
misperception of underlying probabilities, sometimes reflecting subjective attitudes to chance, 
and sometimes a mixture of the two. For discussion and a formalisation following the latter 
PL[HGDSSURDFKVHH$EGHOODRXL/¶+DULGRQ& Paraschiv (2011). For a thorough discussion of 
prospect theoretic models see Wakker (2010). 
  
24 
 
 
For each row of the table please choose either Option A or B 
Row Option A: Lottery 
Your Choice Option B: 
Guaranteed 
amount of A B 
1 
 
 
 
50% chance of 
£10.00 
and 
50% chance of £0.00 
 
Ƒ Ƒ £10.00 
2 Ƒ Ƒ £9.50 
3 Ƒ Ƒ £9.00 
4 Ƒ Ƒ £8.50 
5 Ƒ Ƒ £8.00 
6 Ƒ Ƒ £7.50 
7 Ƒ Ƒ £7.00 
8 Ƒ Ƒ £6.50 
9 Ƒ Ƒ £6.00 
10 Ƒ Ƒ £5.50 
11 Ƒ Ƒ £5.00 
12 Ƒ Ƒ £4.50 
13 Ƒ Ƒ £4.00 
14 Ƒ Ƒ £3.50 
15 Ƒ Ƒ £3.00 
16 Ƒ Ƒ £2.50 
17 Ƒ Ƒ £2.00 
18 Ƒ Ƒ £1.50 
19 Ƒ Ƒ £1.00 
20 Ƒ Ƒ £0.50 
Figure 2: Sample Risk Elicitation Tool 
 
The procedure requires each subject to complete 25 tables of the form 
given in Figure 2. Each table consists of 20 rows, where each row is a choice 
between a two-outcome lottery and a guaranteed amount of money, with the 
guaranteed amount of money decreasing from the high outcome to the low 
RXWFRPHRIWKHORWWHU\LQHTXDOLQFUHPHQWVPRYLQJGRZQWKHURZV7KHVXEMHFW¶V
certainty equivalence, ܥܧ௅, of lottery L can be written as in (3), where the high 
prize of the lottery ݔଵ௅occurs with probability ݌ଵ௅ and the low prize of the 
lottery ݔଶ௅occurs otherwise: 
 ܷሺܥܧ௅ሻ ൌ ܷሺݔଵ௅ሻݓሺ݌ଵ௅ሻ ൅ ܷሺݔଶ௅ሻ൫ ? െ ݓሺ݌ଵ௅ሻ൯Ǥ   (3)  
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We use the switching point from choosing the guaranteed amount (Option B) to 
the lottery ܮ (Option A) as our estimaWHRIWKHVXEMHFW¶VFHUWDLQW\HTXLYDOHQWRI
the lottery.  
To estimate ܷሺǤ ሻ and wሺǤ ሻ we first specify functional forms for value 
and probability weighting functions. We follow Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, & Epper 
(2010) in their choice of flexible and interpretable functions which have been 
widely used elsewhere in the empirical literature. On this basis we use the power 
function for the value function:  
 ܷሺݔሻ ൌ ݔఈ Ǥ      (4)  
 
This specification is parsimonious in modelling risk attitudes via a single 
curvature parameter, ߙ, and has been shown to provide a good fit to a wide 
range of choice data. To allow for non-linear probability weighting in the 
estimation of RDU parameters, we use the linear-in-log-odds function of 
Goldstein & Einhorn (1987): 
 ݓሺ݌ሻ ൌ ఉ௣ംఉ௣ംାሺଵି௣ሻംǤ      (5)  
 
This specification is credited with providing a good account of individual 
heterogeneity (Wu, Zhang & Gonzalez 2004) and its two parameters have the 
advantage of having clear intuitive interpretations (Lattimore 1992; Bruhin, 
Fehr-Duda & Epper 2010): the parameter ߚ FDSWXUHV µHOHYDWLRQ¶ RI WKH
probability weighting function (with greater ߚ UHIOHFWLQJPRUHµRSWLPLVP¶WKH
parameter ߛ controls curvature (the smaller is ߛ, the stronger is deviation from 
linearity). 
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Finally, to operationalize the model requires specification of the 
stochastic decision process. Following Epper, Fehr-Duda & Bruhin (2011) we 
assume that the observed switching point, ܥܧ෢௅, is given by:  
 ܥܧ෢௅ ൌ ܥܧ௅ ൅ ߳௅ ǡ      (6) 
 
where the error terms are independent draws from a normal distribution with 
zero mean. Heteroskedasticity in the error variances across tables is accounted 
for by assuming the standard deviation of the error is proportional to the 
difference between the guaranteed amounts in option B as one moves down the 
rows of the table. The normalized standard deviation and the parameters of U(.) 
and w(.) are then obtained by maximum likelihood estimation. 
 
2.3.2. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment consisted of two parts where Part 1 was the same for all the 
subjects and Part 2 varied according to the treatment. We use Part 1 for eliciting 
subjects' utility and probability weighting functions. The 25 lotteries of Part 1 
are summarized in Table 1 and were adapted from Fehr-Duda, Gennaro & 
Schubert (2006). The order of the lotteries was randomized to avoid order 
effects. 
 After completing Part 1 of the experiment, subjects were asked to 
answer quiz questions where they had to choose the city with the highest 
population out of two options provided. They could earn £0.50 for each correct 
answer. In the Reported Confidence treatment, subjects were asked to provide 
a confidence judgement for each question by filling in the blank "I am ___% 
confident that my answer is correct". In the Inferred Confidence treatment, we 
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introduced our new elicitation tool where subjects were asked to complete a 
table as in Figure 1. They had to complete one table for each quiz question. 
After answering all quiz questions and providing their confidence levels 
(either by reporting or filling in the table), subjects were asked to complete a 
short post-study questionnaire while we checked their answers. We used a 
random lottery incentive system to pay subjects.5 Subjects were paid based on 
one randomly drawn row in one randomly drawn table in one randomly drawn 
part of the experiment. We used physical objects (dice, numbered balls and 
poker chips) to make the independence of the randomization devices very 
salient, and we explained the randomization procedures with simple examples 
and diagrams. The full experimental instructions are available on request. 
Table 1: Risky Prospects of Part 1 of the Experiment 
Lottery p x1 x2 Lottery p x1 x2 
1 0.05 £4 £0 14 0.5 £10 £0 
2 0.05 £8 £2 15 0.5 £10 £4 
3 0.05 £10 £4 16 0.5 £30 £0 
4 0.05 £30 £10 17 0.75 £4 £0 
5 0.1 £2 £0 18 0.75 £8 £2 
6 0.1 £4 £2 19 0.75 £10 £4 
7 0.1 £10 £0 20 0.9 £2 £0 
8 0.25 £4 £0 21 0.9 £4 £2 
9 0.25 £8 £2 22 0.9 £10 0 
10 0.25 £10 £4 23 0.95 £4 £0 
11 0.5 £2 £0 24 0.95 £8 £2 
12 0.5 £4 £2 25 0.95 £10 £4 
13 0.5 £8 £2     
p denotes the probability of the first outcome, x1  
 
 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham, CeDEx 
lab in 2011. Subjects were recruited using Orsee (Greiner 2004). In total 86 
                                                          
5
 The random lottery incentive system is widely used because, despite evidence showing failure 
of the independence axiom, empirical tests broadly support its use. (see Starmer & Sugden 1991, 
Cubitt, Starmer & Sugden 1998). 
  
28 
 
subjects participated; 40 in the inferred confidence treatment (25 male), and 46 
in the reported confidence treatment (23 male). The experiment was conducted 
in pen and paper format with subjects seated in cubicles. The experiment lasted 
approximately 1 hour and the average payment to a participant was £9. 
 
2.4. Results 
We structure the results under three subheadings. In Section 4.1, we compare 
and contrast the data on average confidence elicited in the two treatments. In 
Section 4.2, we present our findings on individual risk attitudes and filtered 
inferred confidence levels. And finally in Section 4.3, we present results looking 
at the relationship between risk attitudes and reported confidence.6  
 
2.4.1. Reproducing Standard Results 
Figure 3 provides a quick eye-balling tool for comparing confidence measured 
using the standard psychological tool with confidence elicited using our 
incentivised mechanism (on the assumption that individuals are risk neutral).  
Consider first the top left panel.  This plots, for each quiz question, the mean of 
reported confidence against the average success rate. The 45-degree line 
provides a natural benchmark in the sense that a general tendency to 
overconfidence would result in points located above the line whereas a general 
tendency towards underconfidence would result in points below it.  
The reported confidence data have a pattern consistent with the familiar 
µKDUG-HDV\ HIIHFW¶ 7R KLJKOLJKW WKLV ZH KDYH GUDZQ D YHUWLFDO GDVKHG OLQH
                                                          
6
 Before proceeding with the analysis, we dropped the data for four quiz questions that were 
potentially misleading because the success rate on each of these questions was less than 40% 
(whereas reported confidence judgements were constrained to the interval 50-100%). We also 
excluded data from tables where subjects switched on one row and then switched back again at 
a later row. Reassuringly, however, less than 2% of the tables included such non-monotonic 
responses. 
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through the question which is the median in terms of its success rate (at around 
,IZHGHILQHµKDUG¶µHDV\¶TXHVWLRQVDVWKRVHZLWKORZHUKLJKHUWKDQ
median success rates it is then apparent that, on average, there is overconfidence 
for all but one of the easy questions and underconfidence for all of the hard 
ones. For each question, we measure miscalibration bias as average confidence 
minus the proportion of correct answers. We then test whether the mean of the 
distribution of biases is equal to zero using a simple t-test. For easy questions 
there is significant underconfidence (average bias = -0.115, p=0.002) while for 
hard questions there is significant overconfidence (average bias = 0.070, 
p=0.001). Pooling hard and easy questions we cannot reject the null of zero 
expected bias (average bias = -0.027, p=0.312), evidently because the positive 
bias on easy questions offsets the negative bias on hard questions. 
The top right panel of Figure 3 provides corresponding analysis for 
confidence inferred from our incentivised elicitation tool, but on the assumption 
that individuals are risk neutral. We refer to this measure as ConfEVi for short 
and, from expression 2 above, it is easy to see that this can be calculated directly 
IURPDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VVZLWFKSRLQWLQDQ\JLven table because ConfEVi = CEi/10. 
Here, all of the observations sit below the 45 degree line indicating a systematic 
and highly significant tendency towards underconfidence (average bias = -
0.212, p=0.000). 
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Figure 3: Confidence and Success 
 
The bottom two panels provide corresponding analysis, but in this case, 
each dot represents an individual, plotting individual average reported 
confidence across tasks against actual success rate in them. For individuals with 
less than median success rate there is marginal overconfidence (p=0.085) and 
for individuals with more than median success rate there is significant 
underconfidence (p=0.041) in reported confidence. Across all individuals in the 
inferred confidence treatment there is general underconfidence (p=0.000).  
Top panels: Each dot represents a question. For a given question Bias = (average 
confidence) ± (average success) across subjects. Average bias is the average bias across 
questions and the reported p-value is for a two-tailed t-test that mean of distribution of 
biases is zero. Bottom panels: Each dot represents a subject. For a given subject bias = 
(average confidence across questions) ± (success rate across questions). Average bias 
is the average across subjects and the reported p-value is for a two-tailed t-test that the 
mean of distribution of biases is zero. 
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  Taken together, the results presented in Figure 3 reproduce a standard 
pattern of findings that has motivated our study. Using a procedure based on 
non-incentivised self-reports of confidence, similar to those used in a range of 
psychological studies, we reproduce a hard-easy effect; in contrast, by using an 
incentivised procedure to elicit confidence we find a marked tendency towards 
underconfidence. 
 
2.4.2. Risk Preferences and Risk-Filtered Confidence 
As we explained above, if individuals are not risk neutral, then confidence 
measures elicited via our incentivised mechanism may be biased because they 
may capture a mixture of confidence assessments and risk attitudes (and 
similarly so for other incentive mechanisms that have so far been used for this 
purpose in the literature). This section takes account of this possibility by 
implementing analysis to filter out the effects of risk attitudes in our incentivised 
confidence measures.    
 To this end, we exploit the data that we obtained from Part 1 of the 
experiment which allows us to fit risk preference models separately for each 
individual. We do this using two leading models of risk preference: expected 
utility theory (EU) and rank-dependent utility theory (RDU). Considering the 
EU and RDU models together, we have 6 parameters to estimate per 
experimental subject: the value function parameter under EU (ߙா௎ሻ; the value 
function and probability weighting parameters under RDU (ߙோ஽௎ǡ ߚ, ߛሻ; and 
the normalized standard deviations of the decision errors (ߪா௎ and ߪோ஽௎ሻ. We 
will omit the discussion of error parameters from the results since they are not 
central to our analysis. 
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Figure 4 summarises the results of fitting these models to individuals in 
RXUµ1RWWLQJKDP¶VWXG\DQGDVDEHQFKPDUNIRURXUHVWLPDWHVZHDOVRUHSRUW
parameters obtained by applying the same econometric method to the data 
reported in Bruhin, Fehr-Duda & Epper (2010) and Epper, Fehr-Duda & Bruhin 
WKHVHDUHODEHOOHGWKHµ=XULFK¶HVWLPDWHV7KHPHDQHVWLPDWHRIߙா௎ for 
Nottingham is substantially less than one, and for 85% of our sample we reject 
the null hypothesis of ߙா௎ = 1, indicating concave utility function (i.e. risk 
aversion).7 This is in line with standard findings (Zurich results are perhaps 
slightly unusual in finding risk neutrality in the EU specification).  For the RDU 
model, the results for Nottingham and Zurich are qualitatively very similar. The 
mean of the value function parameter distribution is close to one in both cases 
and for 75% of Nottingham subjects we cannot reject the null hypothesis that ߙோ஽௎ ൌ  ?. The means of the parameter estimates for the probability weighting 
function are also qualitatively similar across Nottingham and Zurich. The graph 
presented in Figure 4 plots the probability weighting function based on the 
median estimates of ߚ and ߛ of the sample and for 45% of subjects we reject 
the null hypothesis of ߚ ൌ ߛ ൌ  ?ǤThe two plots are clearly qualitatively similar 
in displaying the inverse-s shape which overweights (underweights) small 
(large) probabilities; this is quite typical of the broader empirical literature 
estimating probability weighting functions, at least for data gathered from tasks 
with stated (as opposed to learned) probabilities (for a review see Starmer 2000; 
Fehr-Duda, Gennaro & Schubert 2006). This correspondence between our 
estimates and those obtained in Zurich (and the broader literature) provides 
                                                          
7 The estimate of the ߙ parameter of the EU model did not converge to plausible values for 19 
subjects in our data set (e.g. negative estimates) which we drop from the analysis when we 
assume EU model.  
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some reassurance that our procedures for estimating the risk preference 
measures are reliable (or at least comparably reliable to those based on similar 
procedures elsewhere in the literature). 
 
 
Figure 4: Estimates of Risk Preference Parameters 
 
The significant non-linearity in utility and probability weighting 
functions for the majority of our subjects strongly suggests that ConfEVi is a 
biased measure of confidence. Also notice that from the bottom right panel of 
Figure 3 it is apparent that ConfEVi < 0.5 for a significant proportion of 
individuals (47.5%). Given that each task involved a choice between two 
options, one of which was right, confidence below 50% is implausibly low. In 
our incentivised task, however, risk aversion (say as measured by concavity of 
the utility function) would tend to depress ConfEVi. In other words, the data 
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obtained from our incentivised mechanism might seem more plausible were we 
to filter out potential biases attributable to departures from risk neutrality. 
6LQFH ZH KDYH LQGHSHQGHQW PHDVXUHV RI LQGLYLGXDOV¶ ULVN SDUDPHWHUV
(based on responses to Part 1 of the experiment) we can estimate 
µGHFRQWDPLQDWHG¶RUULVN-filtered measures of inferred confidence. To be more 
specific, based on expression (2) above, we calculate inferred confidence, 
filtered for either EU or RDU as follows:   
C݋݊ ா݂௎೔ ൌ ቀ஼ா೔ଵ଴ ቁఈಶೆ       (7) ܥ݋݊ ோ݂஽௎೔ ൌ ݓିଵ ቀቀ஼ா೔ଵ଴ ቁఈೃವೆቁ ൌ ଵ൬ఉכቀ಴ಶభబቁషഀିఉ൰భംାଵ   (8) 
Here,ܥ݋݊ ா݂௎೔is the confidence measure for question i, estimated on the 
assumption that the subject is an expected utility maximiser (and similarly, 
forܥ݋݊ ோ݂஽௎೔).    
The results of filtering out risk in this way are shown in Figure 5. This 
plots inferred confidence against actual success rates for each question, with 
separate panels for the EV, EU and RDU models. For comparison, we also 
reproduce the reported confidence in the bottom right panel. We observe that (i) 
the extent of underconfidence falls as we move from EV to RDU (p=0.025), (ii) 
the difference between mean biases of reported and inferred confidence 
decreases as we filter out risk attitudes (p=0.023), and (iii) inferred confidence 
is significantly more noisy than reported confidence (Levene (1960) variance 
equality test: p=0.009). These results suggest that, in the absence of filters for 
risk attitude, the extent of underconfidence is exaggerated. By filtering out 
components of these measures attributable to risk attitudes, the overall mean 
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bias falls from -0.212 (inferred confidence under EV) to -0.086 (inferred 
confidence under RDU). 
 
 
 
 
We should emphasise, however, that while confidence miscalibration is 
reduced as a consequence of allowing for risk attitudes, it is not eliminated and 
the mean (underconfidence) bias remains significant for all three measures of 
inferred confidence. AveraJLQJDFURVVTXHVWLRQVVXEMHFWV¶VXFFHVVUDWHVDUH
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Figure 5: Risk Adjusted Confidence and Success 
Each dot represents a question. For a given question Bias = (Average 
Confidence ± Average Success) across subjects. Average bias is the average 
of biases across all questions and the reported p-value is for a two-tailed t-
test that mean of distribution of biases is zero. Absolute Bias = Absolute 
(Average Confidence ± Average Success) across subjects.  
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percentage points higher than their inferred confidences under our most general 
(RDU) specification. For comparison, success rates are 2.7 percentage points 
higher than reported confidence. However, as previously noted, the bias in 
reported confidence varies with difficulty of the question. Thus a better overall 
measure of miscalibration is the average absolute bias (i.e. the sum of vertical 
deviations from the 45 degree line). This is not significantly different for 
inferred RDU confidence (10.2%) compared to reported confidence (11.6%) 
(p=0.666).  
 
2.4.3. Relationship between Reported Confidence and Risk Attitudes 
So far we have focussed on the possibility that risk attitudes may bias 
confidence measured in an incentivised mechanism. As our second research 
objective we explore a possible connection between risk attitudes and 
FRQILGHQFHWKDWRQH¶VFRUUHFWO\PHDVXUHGFRQILGHQFHLQDJLYHQWDVNLVUHODWHG
WRRQH¶VULVNDWWLWXGH2QWKHIDFHRILWLWVHems plausible that confidence might 
be related to risk attitude. For example, some popular contemporary theories of 
risk preference can be interpreted as allowing some departures from risk 
neutrality to arise as consequences of the way that people assess and/or respond 
to probabilities.  For example, prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; 
Tversky & Kahneman 1992) can be interpreted as allowing for both 
misperception of objective probabilities and subjective attitudes to whatever 
probabilities are perceived. To the extent that such processes reflect generic 
properties of the way that humans perceive and respond to risks, that provides 
reason to expect that similar processes might operate in relation to confidence 
judgements because those judgments are assessments of probabilities. In our 
data set, the cleanest way to investigate this is by looking for an association 
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between individual level risk parameters and reported confidence; the latter is 
the best confidence measure for our purposes here because it is the only one of 
our four measures which is independent of risk attitudes (we have already 
concluded that ConfEV is biased by risk attitudes, while ConfEU and ConfRDU use 
individual risk parameters as inputs to their estimation). 
Table 2 presents the results of OLS regression where the dependent 
variable is average reported confidence (subject level). The table reports three 
specifications which differ according to which of the risk parameters from Part 
1 (ߙா௎ ǡ ߙோ஽௎ ǡ ߚǡ ߛ) are included.  The first specification excludes them all, 
the second includes just the EU parameter (i.e. ߙா௎ሻǡ while the third model 
includes all of the parameters of the RDU model. The latter two allow us to 
assess whether, and if so by how much, risk attitudes (as captured by EU or 
RDU models) affect reported confidence judgements. In addition, we also 
include controls for gender, age, and success rate. 
Across all three models, there is no significant association between 
average reported confidence levels and average success rates across subjects.8 
Females are slightly less confident than males, although the effect is only 
marginally significant in the specification that includes EU risk parameters; we 
further discuss the gender results below. There is a small and negative effect of 
age on reported confidence levels. Turning to our central interest in these 
estimates, the risk preference parameters are all highly significant predictors of 
confidence. Moreover, the signs of the coefficients all have quite natural 
                                                          
8
 We also checked the relation between confidence and success in a more disaggregate analysis 
using responses to each question (rather than averages) as the dependent variable.  In this 
analysis, there is a positive and significant association between success and expressed 
FRQILGHQFHOHYHOVFRQILGHQFHLVDERXWKLJKHUZKHQDVXEMHFW¶VDQVZHUWRDTXHVWLRQLV
correct. This relationship fades away in average subject-level analysis which is consistent with 
the findings by e.g. Kruger & Dunning (1999) and Massoni & Roux (2012). 
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interpretations. For both EU and RDU models, greater risk aversion in the form 
of curvature of utility (as captured by ߙா௎ and ߙோ஽௎ሻis associated with lower 
confidence. From the third specification, incorporating RDU parameters, we 
find significant effects of the probability weighting parameters. The ߚ 
parameter controls the elevation of probability weighting function and so has a 
QDWXUDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQDV³SUREDELOLVWLFRSWLPLVP´%UXKLQ)HKU-Duda & Epper 
2010). The positive (and significant) ߚ coefficient thus suggests a positive 
association between probabilistic optimism (revealed, in our experiment in 
FKRLFHVDPRQJORWWHULHVDQGFRQILGHQFHDVUHYHDOHGLQMXGJHPHQWVDERXWRQH¶V
own success in quiz tasks).  The positive effect of ߛ also has a natural 
interpretation.  Recall that ߛ controls curvature of the weighting function, then 
notice that, for our tasks, success rates are such that we are typically operating 
LQ D UHJLRQ ZKHUH WKH PHGLDQ VXEMHFW¶V ZHLJKWLQJ IXQFWLRQ XQGHUZHLJKWV
probabilities. In this region, increases in  ߛ reduce underweighting. Hence, the 
positive sign here is consistent with a positive association between 
underweighting and underconfidence.9  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 We also studied whether confidence and risk attitude parameters co-varied with another 
standard psychological measure of optimism. This was the Life Orientation Scale (LOT) 
adopted from Scheier & Carver (1985), and included in our post experimental questionnaire, 
which classifies individuals according to their optimism (people with positive scores up to a 
maximum of 16) or pessimism (people with negative scores down to a minimum of -16).  We 
find the LOT score is positively correlated with all four individual risk preference parameters 
and significantly so in the cases of ߙோ஽௎ and ߛ (p-values for the respective Pearson correlation 
coefficients are 0.082 and 0.008). We also find the LOT score is positively correlated with 
reported confidence (p=0.013). These results support the interpretation that elicited confidence 
and risk attitudes reflect common psychological traits.     
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Table 2: Determinants of Average Reported Confidence 
Explanatory 
Variables 
No risk 
controls 
EU risk 
controls 
RDU risk 
controls ࢻࡱࢁ  .084*** 
(0.02) 
 ࢻࡾࡰࢁ   .119*** 
(0.05) ࢼ   .090** 
(0.43) ࢽ   .111** 
(0.04) 
Average Success .006 
(0.11) 
.-0.003 
(0.14) 
.034 
(0.10) 
Female -.047 
(0.03) 
-.053* 
(0.03) 
-.038 
(0.03) 
Age -.011** 
(0.01) 
-.015*** 
(0.01) 
-.013* 
(0.01) 
    
Constant .872*** 1.14*** .69*** ࡾഥ૛ .034 .209 .267 ࢔ 43 33 43 
* 10%, ** 5%,  *** 1% significance levels     
Standard errors are in parentheses  
43 subjects in Model EV and RDU, and 33 subjects in Model 
EU (because of missing ߙா௎ parameter for some)  with 
pooled  OLS regression 
 
As a coda to this analysis, it may be interesting to note that while there 
is some evidence of a gender difference in confidence (with females having a 
tendency towards lower confidence in the EU specification), that difference 
disappears when we introduce individual-specific parameters of the probability 
weighting function as controls.  This suggests that differences in reported 
confidence in our data set may be explained by gender-specific differences in 
attitudes to chance as captured by features of probability weighting functions. 
Consistent with this, and in line with Fehr-Duda, Gennaro & Schubert (2006), 
we find thaW IHPDOHV FRPSDUHG WRPHQDUH OHVV µRSWLPLVWLF¶ LQ WKHVHQVHRI
having significantly lower elevation parameters (mean ȕ= 0.609 for females 
compared with 0.823 for males, Wilcoxon ranksum p=0.027).  As we see it, the 
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primary significance of this coda lies not in identifying a gender effect per se, 
but rather in underscoring that confidence appears to co-vary with features of 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VULVNSUHIHUHQFHVLQFOXGLQJERWKWKHLUDWWLWXGHVWRFRQVHTXHQFHVDV
captured by curvature of utility) and their attitudes to chance (as captured by the 
shape of their probability weighting functions). We believe this is a novel, and 
scientifically interesting, finding suggesting the possibility of common 
psychological mechanisms underpinning risk attitudes and confidence 
judgements. 
 
2.5. Discussion 
There is a very large empirical literature investigating confidence judgements 
and much of this point to the presence of overconfidence in a range of 
judgements or the existence of a hard-easy effect. The bulk of this literature, 
however, rests on data generated from non-incentivised self-reports of 
confidence and, more recently, the robustness of conclusions from this line of 
research has been challenged by the emergence of a small number of studies by 
experimental economists which use incentivised tasks to elicit confidence 
judgements and find that overconfidence bias is considerably reduced. Indeed, 
in these recent studies, underconfidence is the typical finding.  
Our study contributes to this literature, and its central novelty lies in 
combining two key design features. Like the recent contributions to the 
economics literature on this topic, we compare confidence miscalibration across 
incentivised and non-incentivised confidence elicitation tasks. We build into our 
design procedures for measuring the risk attitudes of our participants coupled 
with techniques that allow us to track how filtering out risk attitudes affects the 
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measurement of confidence. We are also able to investigate a possible link 
between reported confidence and risk attitudes at the individual level.  
Using a non-incentivised procedure, designed to be very similar to those 
used in much of the background psychology literature, we reproduce the 
standard finding of a hard-easy effect. With our new incentivised confidence 
measurement, regardless of whether or not we filter for risk attitudes, and in line 
with the recent experimental economics literature, we observe a general 
tendency towards underconfidence and the hard-easy effect disappears.  
Our primary novel findings then relate to the impacts of risk aversion 
on measured confidence. In the context of incentivised confidence elicitation, 
we find that filtering out risk attitudes from inferred confidence reduces the 
degree of underconfidence. We also observe a striking association between risk 
attitudes inferred from incentivised decisions about lotteries and confidence 
PHDVXUHGXVLQJWKHVWDQGDUGSV\FKRORJLVW¶VWRRO6SHFLILFDOO\LQGLYLGXDOVZKR
are more risk averse (based on curvature of a best fitting EU function) or more 
pessimistic (based on best fitting estimates of their RDU probability weighting 
function) tend to express lower confidence.  We also find evidence that gender 
differences in reported confidence (women tend to be less confident) may be 
explained by gender differences in specific components of risk attitudes 
(women tend to be less optimistic, that is they tend to show lower elevation of 
the probability weighting function).  
As far as we know, we are the first to identify that probability weighting 
may play a significant role in determining confidence judgements. Should we 
be surprised by this finding? We suspect that priors will differ considerably 
across economists. To those who tend to think of measured probability 
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weighting as a consequence of more general underlying principles of 
cognition, the manifestation of those principles in another domain will be 
reassuring, but not, perhaps especially surprising. We suspect, however, that 
many other economists aware of evidence for probability weighting may, quite 
reasonably, think of it as an essentially empirical regularity derived, mainly, 
from observing choices among simple gambles, with stated probabilities. To 
those who do interpret it in this, more limited, way our results are arguably 
much more surprising by establishing a clear empirical connection between 
responses to probabilities in two very different domains: one involving 
attachment of certainty equivalents to gambles with stated probabilities (Part 1 
of our experiment); the other involving self-reported probability judgements 
about one's own success rate in a given question (Part 2 of our experiment). 
We suggest that the ability of measured probability weighting to predict 
behaviour in these very different tasks and domains should lead to positive 
reconsideration of the explanatory scope and significance of the concept of 
probability weighting within economics. 
Given that probability weighting does appear to influence confidence 
MXGJHPHQWV LW LV QDWXUDO WR DVN ZKHWKHU RWKHU µQRQ-VWDQGDUG¶ DVSHFWV RI
preference in relation to risk or uncertainty might affect confidence 
judgements. In this respect, an obvious candidate to consider is ambiguity 
aversion, particularly since confidence judgments appear to be intrinsically 
ambiguous (as opposed to risky). Although this raises issues beyond the 
boundaries of the present study, our debriefing questionnaire did include two 
tasks intended to provide a preliminary assessment of whether, and if so how 
much, ambiguity attitudes impact confidence judgments. These preliminary 
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investigations failed to reveal any significant relationship between ambiguity 
attitudes and confidence as measured by our new tool. Nor indeed did we find 
any relationship between ambiguity attitudes and self-reported confidence. 
This is, of course, far from conclusive evidence that there is no relationship to 
discover, and we would certainly support calls for further research into this 
issue and the broader question - previously highlighted by Hoelzl & Rustichini 
(2005), Offerman et al. (2009) and Kothiyal et al. (2011) - of how to assess and 
control the potential impact of ambiguity attitudes in the context of 
incentivised belief elicitation. 
We conclude the present paper with a brief cautionary remark. 
Economists have, understandably, shown an interest in the large volume of 
evidence supporting overconfidence.  While it seems entirely appropriate to 
analyse the consequences of confidence miscalibration, it now looks naïve to 
proceed, as some have done in the past, by simply assuming overconfidence as 
a reasonable empirical assumption (Odean 1999; Compte & Postlewaite 2004; 
Malmendier & Tate 2005; Galasso & Simcoe 2011; Gervais, Heaton & Odean 
2011). In contrast, our results, alongside other recent work (e.g., Hoelzl & 
Rustichini 2005; Moore & Healy 2008; Blavatskyy 2009; Clark & Friesen 2009; 
Merkle & Weber 2011), support the following conclusion: while miscalibration 
of confidence judgements is a real phenomenon which persists in controlled 
incentivised decisions, there is currently ± and perhaps ironically ± apparent 
overconfidence regarding the empirical significance of overconfidence. We 
hope that our work provides a helpful input to recalibration. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF IMPLICIT AND 
EXPLICIT INFORMATION IN MARKET ENTRY 
GAMES 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Previous research has shown that the industries with high entry rates also tend 
to have high rates of business failure (Dunne, Roberts & Samuelson 1988; Mata 
& Portugal 1994). The often cited phenomenon in the literature labelled as the 
better than average (BTA) effect (also known as relative overconfidence) has 
been used as one of the explanations for high entry and failure rates of 
businesses (Camerer & Lovallo 1999). More recently though, researchers have 
found evidence of a worse than average (WTA) effect in situations involving 
difficult tasks where people are usually underconfident relative to others (for a 
review see Moore 2007). Observing the two effects, Cain, Moore & Haran 
(2013) study whether the perceived ease of operating in the market can 
determine entry rates to the market. They  use real market entry data in various 
industries and show that there is excessive entry to industries classified as 
³VLPSOH´HJIRRGVWRUHVKREE\VKRSVDQGUHVWDXUDQWVDQGLQVXIILFLHQWHQWU\
WR LQGXVWULHV FODVVLILHG DV ³GLIILFXOW´ HJ IRUHVWU\ DJULFXOWXUH DQG IDbricated 
metal production) controlling for costs of entry.  
In this paper we study the BTA/WTA effect in the context of 
experimental market entry games where decision makers play a role of an 
entrepreneur deciding whether to enter a market or stay out. More specifically, 
we look at the effect of implicit and explicit information on the BTA/WTA 
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effect in the context of repeated decisions in experimental markets where we 
manipulate difficulty levels. In two between-subject treatments, we either 
manipulate subMHFWVEHLQJLQIRUPHGDERXWRWKHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHV implicitly via 
being a part of a group or explicitly via receiving statistical information about 
historical performance in a task. We test the extent of BTA/WTA effect across 
information treatments and how it interacts with repetition and feedback over 
multiple rounds of market entry game.  
In almost all previous BTA/WTA studies, individuals have some 
information about themselves (their general ability, memories and experiences) 
and relatively little information about others (Svenson 1981; Weinstein 1980; 
Camerer & Lovallo 1999). This is also the case in one of our treatments where 
individuals make decisions about whether or not to enter a market only knowing 
about their own performances in a task. In another treatment, entry decisions 
are made by groups. In this case the interaction within a group gives individuals 
DGGLWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWRWKHUV¶DELOLWLHVLQDWDVNDQGVRLQIRUPDWLRQDERXW
others is implicitly embedded in the decision environment via group decision 
making. By comparing entry decisions and beliefs of groups to that of 
individuals we test whether groups can serve as implicit informational channels 
DERXWFRPSHWLWRUV¶DELOLWLHVDQGZKHWKHUWKLVZLOOUHGXFH%7$:7$HIIHFWV 
A broader motivation is to study the behaviour of groups in competitive 
environments. Many important real world competitions are between collections 
of individuals (teams or groups) rather than single individuals, such as sport 
tournaments, inter-organizational grant competitions and inter-firm 
competitions to capture higher market share. Observing different patterns of 
behaviour and beliefs between individuals and groups may suggest whether 
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groups are prone to certain biases more than individuals (or vice versa) and 
hence justify the use of either individual or group decision making in certain 
environments. There are relatively few studies in the literature looking at the 
behaviour of groups compared to individuals in competitive settings (exceptions 
include Sutter & Strassmair 2009; Sheremeta & Zhang 2010; Healy & Pate 
2011; Dargnies 2012). Our paper adds to this small literature by studying 
competitive behaviour and relative performance assessment of groups 
compared to individuals. The related literature is discussed in detail in Section 
2.  
To study the effect of explicit information on experimental entry 
behaviour and beliefs, we directly manipulate the knowledge of individuals 
about population performance by giving individuals statistical information 
about average historical performance in a task. We choose to study historical 
information instead of real time information in the lab for two reasons. First, 
outside of the lab, historical information can be retrieved much more easily and 
is more accessible than real time information, and thus has more relevance from 
an external validity standpoint. Second, the higher accessibility of historical 
information, in turn, makes it a more relevant tool for both agents and policy 
makers. For example, entrepreneurs revising their business strategies can base 
their strategies on historical performance information across sectors and 
competitors, while competition organizers can give historical information to 
potential competitors to deter or encourage entry to sports tournaments. 
&RPSDULQJ HQWU\ GHFLVLRQV DQG EHOLHIV RI LQGLYLGXDOV¶ ZLWK DQG ZLWKRXW
historical performance information, we will test whether explicit information 
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mitigates or eliminates BTA/WTA effect. The full details of our experimental 
design are presented in Section 3. 
Section 4 presents our results. The results show that both groups and 
individuals choose to enter excessively to simple markets and too often stay out 
of the difficult markets. Groups are better at predicting the entry rate and 
average performance of others than individuals but nevertheless demonstrate a 
similar biased pattern in their entry decisions to individuals. When individuals 
are given explicit historical information about performance, the BTA/WTA 
effect in entry behaviour is much less in the first half of the experiment and 
eventually dies out entirely in the second half of the experiment. We find that 
beliefs about own relative standings can explain entry behaviour better than 
other elicited beliefs. We also identify an interesting gender effect in our study 
which shows that females are less confident than men but only when they are 
deciding individually rather than deciding in a group. Section 5 discusses the 
implications of our findings and concludes.  
 
3.2 Related Literature 
In an experimental market entry game, subjects decide to enter a market or stay 
out and each of those who entered receives a ranking. Depending on a pre-
determined market capacity, a certain number of high ranked players receive a 
positive payoff and those ranked below that number receive a negative payoff 
which is less than a safe payoff of staying out. It has been shown that the Nash 
equilibrium solution predicts very well the aggregate entry behaviour of 
subjects in these types of games where rankings are randomly assigned to each 
entrant (Sundali, Rapoport, & Seale 1995; Rapoport, Seale, Erev, & Sundali 
1998). Camerer & Lovallo (1999) exploit this property of experimental market 
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entry games to measure the relative confidence of individuals in a competitive 
setting. In contrast to previous findings, subjects fail to coordinate in their entry 
decisions when their rankings are determined according to their scores in a quiz 
task. The authors conclude that people are overconfident in their relative 
abilities and hence enter excessively.  
&DPHUHU 	 /RYDOOR¶V ILQGLQJ LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH UHODWLYH
overconfidence bias often cited in the psychology literature. Recent 
developments, however, have suggested a more complex pattern in relative 
confidence judgements by identifying situations where people usually believe 
they are worse than others. These situations involve difficult tasks such as 
computer programming, unicycle riding, coping with a death of a loved one and 
graduating in the top 1% of a class (Windschitl et al. 2003; Kruger & Burrus 
2004; Kruger, Windschitl, Burrus & Fessel 2008). Don Moore and his 
FROOHDJXHVLQDVHULHVRIUHFHQWSDSHUVVKRZWKDW&DPHUHUDQG/RYDOOR¶VILQGLQJ
is valid for tasks that are perceived as simple. For tasks perceived as difficult, 
underconfidence is more prevalent and causes insufficient entry rate below 
market capacity and hence, foregone potential payoffs (Moore & Cain 2007; 
Moore, Oesch & Zietsma 2007; Moore & Small 2007; Radzevick & Moore 
2008; Cain, Moore & Haran 2013).  
Moore & Cain (2007) investigate whether repetition and feedback 
eliminate overentry/underentry to markets with simple/difficult tasks. They 
show that neither overentry nor underentry is reduced through repetition and 
feedback. Looking at the beliefs of participants, they find that people are 
accurate in predicting the number of entrants (the same is true in Camerer and 
/RYDOOR¶VSDSHUEXWGHPRQVWUDWHVLJQLILFDQW%7$:7$HIIHFWVLQEHOLHIVDERXW
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own percentile rankings relative to competitors. Hence, they conclude that it is 
the relative confidence that primarily determines entry decisions. In this paper, 
we adopt the same protocol of entry decisions and belief elicitations as Moore 
& Cain (2007) to test if over/underentry to easy/difficult markets is reduced or 
eliminated with the informational treatment manipulations.  
Whether group decision making provides implicit informational 
FKDQQHOVDERXWRWKHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHVDQGHQKDQFHDVVHVVPHQWVRIRZQUHODWLYH
performances is, as far as we are aware, a novel research question.  The previous 
literature finds that groups are found to make more self-interested, outcome 
oriented, strategic decisions and are cognitively more sophisticated than 
individuals, hence make less errors in their decisions and learn faster (for a 
review see Charness & Sutter 2012).  Groups of three have been shown to 
perform better when competing against individuals in beauty contest games 
because they are one step ahead of individuals in hierarchical reasoning (Kocher 
& Sutter 2005; Sutter 2005; Kocher, Strauss, & Sutter 2006). Market entry 
games are similar to beauty contest games in the way that one should engage in 
KLHUDUFKLFDO UHDVRQLQJ WR SUHGLFW RWKHUV¶ EHOLHIV DERXW HQWU\ EHKDYLRXU E\
responding to these beliefs accordingly in their entry decisions. Also teams of 
two players have been shown to behave more strategically in signalling game 
experiments demonstrating more learning transfer between games compared to 
individuals (Cooper & Kagel 2005). Given these findings, we expect that groups 
will be better informed about the performances of the competitors and more 
successful in strategizing the decision environment in market entry games. 
The literature on competition between groups versus individuals is 
scarce and mostly concentrates on differences in the strategies chosen in games. 
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For example, McCallum, Harring, Gilmore, Drenan, Chase, Insko & Thibaut 
 ORRN DW WKH GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ G\DGV DQG LQGLYLGXDOV LQ SULVRQHU¶V
dilemma and ³mutual fate control´ games and find that groups are more 
cRPSHWLWLYH DQG OHVV FRRSHUDWLYH WKDQ LQGLYLGXDOV PRVWO\ FDXVHG E\ JURXSV¶
stronger desire to win or avoid losing. Sutter & Strassmair (2009) look at the 
effect of communication in tournaments between and within teams and find that 
communication increases chosen effort levels within teams and decreases 
between teams. Healy & Pate (2011) and Dargnies (2012) study how 
competition in teams can help to close the gender gap in competitive 
preferences. They compare tournament entry behaviour of individuals to dyads 
and show that women tend to enter competitions more often while men tend to 
avoid competitions when in teams. Sheremeta & Zhang (2010) show that dyads 
make less risky decisions, which explains why they make lower bids in contests. 
Our study will be one of the first studies to directly FRPSDUH LQGLYLGXDOV¶
competition entry behaviour and relative confidence to that of groups. As in 
many real world group interaction settings and differently from the other 
existing studies we do not restrict communication within the group.  
One of the causes for the emergence of BTA/WTA effects in 
FRPSHWLWLYH HQYLURQPHQWV LV DUJXHG WR EH ³GLIIHUHQWLDO LQIRUPDWLRQ´ - the 
asymmetry of information one possesses about self versus others (Moore 2007). 
In our third treatment, we look at the effect of explicit information about the 
average historical performance of others on market entry behaviour. This 
treatment is closely related to the second study of Moore & Cain (2007) and a 
more recent study by Ewers (2013). Moore and Cain check how historical 
information of the distribution of performance affects relative percentile 
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UDQNLQJVRILQGLYLGXDOV6XEMHFWVZHUHDVNHGWKHTXHVWLRQ³:KDWSHUFHQWDJHRI
WKHJURXSZLOOKDYHVFRUHVEHORZ\RXUV"´EHIRUHWDking the quiz, after taking the 
quiz but before receiving historical distributional information, and after 
receiving information. They show that after subjects were given information, 
the BTA/WTA effect in their percentile rankings disappears, but slight 
overconfidence persists: subjects on average place themselves on 55th percentile 
in both difficult and simple tasks. We will be looking at the effect of historical 
information on percentile beliefs of our subjects and also whether it translates 
into their market entry decisions. Ewers (2013) match subjects in pairs who 
complete a task and can choose to enter the competition with the other or stay 
RXW 7KH DXWKRU VKRZV WKDW JLYLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW RSSRQHQWV¶ DYHUDJH RU
distribution of performances eliminates competition failures: potential losers 
VXFFHVVIXOO\ VWD\ RXW RI WKH FRPSHWLWLRQ 'LIIHUHQWO\ IURP (ZHUV¶ VWXG\ ZH
choose to use historical performance information instead of real time 
information about the performance of the current opponents. Our motivation in 
using historical information was that historical performance information is more 
available in real world settings than real time performance information and 
hence is a more available tool from a perspective of policy makers.  
3.3 Experimental Design 
We extended 0RRUH	&DLQ¶VH[SHULPHQWDOGHVLJQZKLFKLQWXUQZDV
built on the design of Camerer & Lovallo (1999). Our experiment consisted of 
12 rounds of a market entry game. In each round, 7 players decided 
simultaneously and without communication whether to enter a market or stay 
out. The market capacity, which was equal to 3, determined how many of the 
entrants would earn money. Entrants were ranked either randomly or by their 
scores in a trivia quiz. Those ranked below 3rd lost money, while non-entrants 
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lost nothing. The payoff depended on the rank of an entrant, such that higher 
ranked entrants earned more than lower ranked ones; payoffs were determined 
according to Table 1 which was presented to subjects during instructions. The 
three types of rounds were Simple ± ranking according to a simple quiz, 
Difficult ± ranking according to a difficult quiz and Random ± ranking 
randomly. Since subjects participated in both random- and quiz conditions, their 
decisions in the random rounds act as a within-subject control for risk attitudes. 
The difference in the number of entrants in the random and quiz rounds is the 
primary measure of interest of over and under entry. 
To study the effect of group decision making as a possible implicit 
information channel, we compare the entry decisions and beliefs of individual 
decision maker (treatment Individual) to those of a group of three subjects 
(treatment Group). We also test how explicit information affects entry decisions 
and beliefs of our subjects by giving them historical average performance 
information (treatment IndividualInfo) and comparing to those of subjects in the 
Individual treatment. 
In each round we gave our subjects a decision sheet according to which 
they knew whether it was a random round or a quiz round. We did not explicitly 
separate quiz rounds as simple and difficult to avoid framing effects. In a 
random round, a decision maker had to choose whether to enter a market or stay 
out and received a random score which determined his ranking in case he 
entered. In a quiz round, in addition to deciding about entry, a decision maker 
answered a 5 question quiz. He received a score according to the number of his 
correct answers to a quiz and was ranked according to this score if he chose to 
enter the market. Each quiz had a tiebreaker question which eliminated any 
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SRVVLELOLW\ RI D WLH GHSHQGLQJ RQ WKH DQVZHU¶V GLVWDQFH IURP WKH FRUUHFW
numerical answer.   
Table 1: Experimental Payoff 
from Entering a Market 
Rank Payoff 
1st £14 
2nd £10 
3rd £5 
4th -£10 
5th -£10 
6th -£10 
7th -£10 
 
We wanted to observe the effect of our treatment variables on entry 
decisions and beliefs interacting with feedback and repetition to see whether 
there is any learning throughout the experimental session. Each session had four 
blocks of three rounds. Each block consisted of one Random, one Simple and 
one Difficult round. The order was counterbalanced either in 
SimpleRandomDifficult or DifficultRandomSimple order across experimental 
sessions to avoid order effects and stayed the same for all four blocks within a 
session. Simple round quizzes had an average of 4.4 correct answers whereas 
difficult round quizzes had an average of 0.7 correct answers out of 5. The quiz 
questions were designed and pretested so that the variance of the number of 
correct answers was small across subjects and at least 5 of 7 subjects would get 
the same number of correct answers. The four simple and four difficult quizzes 
appear in Appendix A. The order of the quizzes across blocks was also 
randomized. 
Each round of a market entry game consisted of an entry decision, belief 
elicitation and feedback stages. The entry decision stage was timed as 3 minutes 
if it was a quiz and as 1 minute if it was a random round. After taking their entry 
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decisions and before getting feedback, subjects answered the following five 
TXHVWLRQVDERXWWKHLUEHOLHIVUHJDUGLQJWKHLURZQDQGRWKHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFH 
1. How many entrepreneurs10 in total do you think entered the market this 
round?  Include yourself in this figure if you chose to enter.   
2. How many of the other six entrepreneurs in this round do you think scored 
higher than you did (regardless of whether anyone entered)? 
3. How many quiz questions (out of questions 1-5) do you think you got 
correct in this round? 
4. How many quiz questions (out of questions 1-5) do you think the average 
entrepreneur got correct this round? 
5. If you chose to enter the market this round, what rank do you think you 
will get? 
These questions measured beliefs of individuals as well as groups. By 
contrasting the beliefs of groups and individuals, we will be able to test whether 
groups appear more informed than individuals and if so we will say that groups 
are acting as implicit informational channels. Belief elicitation is not 
incentivized as we wanted to replicate exactly the Camerer & Lovallo (1999) 
and Moore & Cain (2007) design so as to be able to compare our results to 
theirs. After answering these questions, every individual/group received full 
IHHGEDFNRQWKHLURZQDQGRWKHUV¶VFRUHVHQWU\GHFLVLRQVDQGUDQNLQJV11 The 
feedback for all previous rounds stayed on the computer screens throughout the 
experimental session. The individual/group numbers were anonymous and 
could not be linNHGWRSDUWLFLSDQWV¶LGHQWLWLHV(DFKLQGLYLGXDOJURXSNQHZWKHLU
                                                          
10
 0RRUHDQG&DLQ¶V  LQVWUXFWLRQV ZHUH IUDPHGVXFK WKDW VXEMHFWVSOD\HGD UROHRI DQ
entrepreneur who could open a restaurant and we followed their procedure. Instructions can be 
found in Appendix B. 
11
 The sample feedback screen can be seen in Appendix C.  
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RZQQXPEHUEXWGLGQRWNQRZRWKHULQGLYLGXDOV¶JURXSV¶QXPEHUVDQGLQZKLFK
cubicle they were seated.  
The Individual and IndividualInfo treatments were identical with the 
only difference between treatments being one sentence in their entry decision 
VKHHWVIROORZLQJWKHTXL]7KHVHQWHQFHUHDGDV³7KHDYHUDJHQXPEHURIFRUUHFW
DQVZHUVLQSUHYLRXVVHVVLRQVZDV«RXWRI´$VDPSOHGHFLVLRQVKHHWFDQEH
seen in Appendix D. In the Group treatment, 21 participants were randomly 
allocated 7 group numbers and seated in a cubicle in groups of three.12 Group 
members could discuss their answers and decisions face-to-face among 
themselves and submit one decision sheet per group. Subjects were given 
enough time to submit their decisions and were free to do anything they want 
during this time as long as they did not try to communicate to other groups or 
use any electronic devices.  
There were 18 experimental sessions in total, each with 7 decision 
makers: there were 6 Individual, 6 IndividualInfo and 6 Group treatment 
sessions with a total of 210 participants.13 The experiment was conducted in the 
CeDEx laboratory where participants were seated in cubicles and lasted on 
average 60 minutes. The experiment was in pen and paper format, where the 
decision sheets were immediately analysed and feedback was given through Z-
WUHH )LVFKEDFKHU  YLD FRPSXWHU PRQLWRUV RQ SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ GHVNV 7KH
experiment was not fully computerized because of the open-ended nature of the 
quiz questions.  
                                                          
12
 Groups were seated so that there was ample space between each group to prevent 
contamination and attempt of interaction between groups. They were also visually segregated 
and could not see anyone except their own group members.  
13
 All participants were British students at the University of Nottingham recruited through Orsee 
(Greiner 2004). 
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At the end of the 12 rounds, three rounds were randomly chosen for 
payoff. The earnings (or losses) from these three rounds were averaged and this 
DPRXQWZDVDGGHGWRRUVXEWUDFWHGIURPWKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶VHQGRZPHQW,Q
the Group condition, each group member earned the same amount of money 
which was calculated identically to the individual treatments. The maximum 
possible payoff to a participant was £24, if a player entered and ranked first in 
all three payoff rounds (£10 endowment plus £14 earning). It was also possible 
for a subject to leave the experiment empty-handed if in all three payoff rounds 
he entered and ranked below third (-£10 average loss plus £10 endowment). The 
actual average payment to a participant was £11.7 with a range of £0 to £24.  
 
3.4 Results 
In this section, we present our results looking at the market entry behaviour and 
beliefs of our subjects. We check whether we replicate the standard finding in 
the literature of overentry to simple and underentry to difficult markets across 
our treatment conditions and if there are significant differences between 
treatments in entry behaviour. By looking at entry behaviour and beliefs of 
individuals with and without historical information, we will examine whether 
additional information mitigates or eliminates BTA/WTA effect and how it 
interacts with repetition and feedback over rounds. We check whether groups 
are more informed than individuals in their beliefs and whether this translates 
inWREHWWHUHQWU\GHFLVLRQVE\FRPSDULQJJURXSV¶EHKDYLRXUDQGEHOLHIVWRWKDW
of individuals. We then examine whether elicited beliefs, or other individual 
characteristics, predict entry behaviour across our treatment conditions.    
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3.4.1 Entry Rates  
First we look at whether we replicate the previous finding that people enter 
excessively to simple markets and stay out too often from difficult markets. 
Figure 1 presents the entry frequencies to different markets for all three 
treatment conditions pooled together. There is a significant difference in entry 
rates between simple and difficult rounds. The distribution of entry rates is 
skewed to the left for difficult rounds and to the right for simple rounds. In 
random rounds, subjects successfully coordinate their entry decisions on the 
mixed Nash equilibrium such that in most of the random rounds (80%), between 
3 and 5 people enter the market.14 In simple rounds, on the other hand, we 
observe coordination failure where in most of the simple rounds (72%), 5 or 
more subjects entered. In difficult rounds, on the other hand, subjects forego 
potential profits by entering too little: in 70% of difficult rounds 3 or fewer 
players entered.   
 
 
                                                          
14
 Coordinating on market capacity is Pareto Efficient equilibrium of market entry games but 
there is a positive expected payoff of entering if less than five players enter. Mixed Nash 
equilibria and theoretical predictions of market entry games are discussed in Moore & Cain 
(2007). 
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Pooled across Individual, IndividualInfo and Group treatments. There are 72 
rounds per simple, random and difficult conditions. 
Figure 1: Histogram of Entry Rates in Three Different Ranking 
Conditions 
Number of entrants 
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Table 2: The Mean Difference Between Entry to Easy and Difficult 
Rounds 
 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Individual 4 
(p=.000) 
4 
(p=.002) 
1 
(p=.111) 
2.34 
(p=.008) 
Individual_Info 2 
(p=.010) 
2.5 
(p=.042) 
0.5 
(p=.363) 
-0.33 
(p=.611) 
Group 5.16 
(p=.000) 
4 
(p=.009) 
0.66 
(p=.394) 
2.17 
(p=.041) 
The p-values are from a two tailed t-test to test for the hypothesis of the 
difference being equal to zero.  
 
To assess the effect of repetition and feedback on entry behaviour, we 
look at the dynamics of entry rates across rounds for each of the three 
experimental treatments (Figure 2). Block 1 reports the first three rounds of the 
simple, random and difficult conditions, Block 2 reports the second three rounds 
and so forth. The entry rate to random rounds serves as a benchmark entry rate 
for a non-risk neutral decision maker. Hence the significant difference in entry 
between random and quiz rounds is an evidence of over/under entry.  
In the first block of the experiment, we observe a significant difference 
in entry rates to easy and difficult rounds in all of the treatments. Table 2 reports 
the mean difference between entry rates to easy and difficult rounds across 
blocks and treatment conditions. In Blocks 1 and 2, there are significant 
differences between simple and difficult rounds in all of the treatments. In Block 
3, the difference disappears and this is mainly driven by the entry rate to difficult 
markets which increases across blocks. This pattern in Block 3 was also evident 
LQ0RRUH	&DLQ¶VGDWD,QWKHODVWEORFNZHREVHUYHDGLIIHUent pattern 
for each treatment. Whereas in the Individual and Group treatments there is 
significant positive difference in entry rates to easy and difficult markets, we 
observe higher entry to difficult than to simple markets in IndividualInfo 
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treatment (although it is not statistically significant) in Block 4. Given these 
results, we conclude that repetition and feedback work only when combined 
with the provision of additional historical performance information that subjects 
receive in the IndividualInfo treatment which eliminates the bias completely in 
the last two blocks of the experiment.  
 
 
 
3.4.2 Beliefs 
:H HOLFLWHG VXEMHFWV¶ EHOLHIV ZLWK D TXHVWLRQQDLUH DW WKH HQG RI HDFK
round after entry decisions were taken. We analyse the accuracy of subjects to 
predict the entry rate in a given round and check whether beliefs differ across 
WUHDWPHQWVDQGEORFNV7RVWXG\WKH%7$:7$HIIHFWZHHOLFLWVXEMHFWV¶EHOLHIV
Figure 2: Entry Rates in Three Different Ranking Conditions Across Four 
Blocks.   
Error bars show 95% confidence intervals 
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about their relative performance rankings which serve as a measure of relative 
confidence with respect to competitors. We test whether groups serve as implicit 
information channels for decision makers so that groups are more informed 
about the skills and entry decisions of competitors compared to individuals. We 
also test whether giving individuals historical information about past 
performances makes them more accurate in their beliefs.   
3.4.2.1 Beliefs About Entry Rates 
After entry decisions were taken, we asked subjects to predict how many 
HQWUDQWV WKHUH ZHUH LQ D JLYHQ URXQG :H PHDVXUH WKH DFFXUDF\ RI VXEMHFWV¶
beliefs by the absolute difference between predicted and actual entry rates, 
where the smaller the difference the more accurate one is. Over all rounds, the 
average absolute difference between predicted and actual entry rate was 1.5 in 
the Individual treatment, 1.32 in the Group treatment and 1.17 in the 
IndividualInfo treatment indicating that subjects in the IndividualInfo treatment 
were the most accurate. If we test the equality of the predicted entry rate to the 
actual entry rate for each round, we reject the null hypotheses of equality in 9 
out of 12 rounds in Individual, 7 out of 12 rounds in Group and 6 out of 12 
rounds in IndividualInfo treatments (Table E1 of Appendix E). This is in 
contrast to the findings of Camerer & Lovallo (1999) and Moore & Cain (2007) 
who find that individuals are able to correctly predict entry rates of others in 
almost all rounds. In Table 3, we regress predictive accuracy of the entry rate 
on treatment dummies, dummy variables for the first or the second part of the 
experiment, the difficulty level and their interaction terms. We observe that 
groups and individuals with information are better at predicting entry rates 
compared to individuals without information. The positive coefficient of the 
Block dummy indicates a significant improvement of predictions of entry rates 
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in the second half of the experiment compared to the first half. Moreover, 
subjects are less accurate in predicting entry rates in difficult rounds than in 
simple rounds as seen by a significant coefficient of the Difficulty dummy. 
 
Table 3: Dependant Variable Absolute Difference Between Predicted 
and Actual Entry Rates 
 Model 1 Model 2 
IndividualInfo  -0.334*** -0.452*** 
Group  -0.181* -0.384*** 
Block -0.129** -0.345*** 
Block*IndividualInfo  0.23* 
Block*Group  0.408*** 
Difficult  0.331*** 
Female  0.059 
Constant 1.56*** 1.67*** 
N 1505 1505 
Adj-Rsq 0.018 0.022 
OLS regression clustered by individual and group id. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
significance level. Block is a dummy variable for the first and second half of 
the experiment. Difficult is a dummy variable for the difficult and simple 
tasks. Female variable in the Group treatment is measured as the proportion 
of females in a group. 
 
 
3.4.2.2 Relative Confidence Beliefs 
7RDVVHVV%7$:7$HIIHFWLQEHOLHIVDFURVVGLIILFXOW\OHYHOVZHHOLFLWVXEMHFWV¶
UHODWLYH FRQILGHQFH EHOLHIV E\ DVNLQJ WKHP ³+RZ PDQ\ RI WKH RWKHU VL[
HQWUHSUHQHXUV LQ WKLV URXQG GR \RX WKLQN VFRUHG KLJKHU WKDQ \RX GLG"´ 7KH
lower the number they report, the more confident they are in their assessment 
of scoring relative to others. Answering 3 to the question means that a subject 
places himself on the median of ranking 4th out of 7 participants and hence we 
will test the null hypotheses of average expected ranks being equal to 4. The 
change of expected relative confidence across blocks is graphed in Figure 4 
showing the histogram of mean beliefs about their ranks (1 added to their 
answers to the above question to test rank equals 4).  
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 On average, subjects in the Individual treatment believed to rank 4.1 in 
simple rounds (Wilcoxon sign rank test p=0.443) and on average 4.5 in difficult 
rounds (Wilcoxon sign rank test p=0.001). This indicates that individuals, on 
average, were well calibrated in simple tasks but underconfident in difficult 
tasks and this result is valid in all four blocks of the Individual treatment. 
However, we have to note that the significant underconfidence in difficult tasks 
is mainly driven by underconfidence in Block 2 and is not observed in the other 
blocks. Removing Block 2, on average we observe well calibration both in 
simple and difficult rounds of the Individual treatment. We observe a similar 
pattern in the IndividualInfo treatment. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
subjects being well calibrated in simple rounds ranking themselves on 3.96 
(Wilcoxon sign rank test p=0.735) and on average being significantly 
underconfident in difficult rounds ranking themselves on 4.51 (Wilcoxon sign 
rank test p=0.003). Differently from the Individual treatment, there is significant 
difference in confidence between simple and difficult rounds in the first half of 
the IndividualInfo treatment (3.76 versus 4.77, Wilcoxon sign rank test 
p=0.002) and no significant difference between simple and difficult rounds in 
the second half of the treatment (4.15 versus 4.25, Wilcoxon sign rank test 
p=0.619) This result is caused by a significant decrease in relative confidence 
in simple rounds (from 3.76 to 4.15, Wilcoxon sign rank test p=0.051) and a 
significant increase in relative confidence in difficult rounds (from 3.77 to 4.25, 
Wilcoxon sign rank test p=0.063) from first to the second half of the experiment. 
We conclude that giving subjects historical information helps subjects to learn 
to calibrate their beliefs about their relative performance from first to the second 
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half of the experiment, whereas we do not observe the same learning for the 
subjects in the Individual treatment.   
Groups on average are relatively overconfident in simple rounds 
reporting ranking on 3.05 (Wilcoxon sign rank test p=0.000) and we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of them being relatively well calibrated in difficult 
rounds reporting ranking on 4.10 (Wilcoxon sign rank test p=0.401). There is a 
more pronounced difference in confidence between simple and difficult rounds 
in the first two blocks (2.74 versus 3.62, Wilcoxon sign rank test p=0.000) 
which disappears in the third block (3.55 versus 3.38, Wilcoxon sign rank test 
p=0.193) but remains significant in the last block of the experiment (3.14 versus 
3.79, Wilcoxon sign rank test p=0.001).  
We identify an interesting gender effect in beliefs about relative 
performance. We find that females, on average, are relatively less confident and 
place themselves in lower ranks (and more specifically below median rank) than 
males both in the Individual (4.83 versus 3.72, Wilcoxon ranksum p=0.000) and 
the IndividualInfo (4.33 versus 4.00, Wilcoxon ranksum p=0.022) treatments. 
In the Group treatment, we compare the relative confidence of the groups 
containing only females to the groups containing only males and find no 
significant difference between them (3.91 versus 3.71, Wilcoxon ranksum 
p=0.628). It has been previously found that when in groups females are as 
competitive as males and do not shy away from competition (Healy & Pate 
2011; Dargnies 2012). Our finding that women in groups have similar beliefs 
about their relative performances as men in groups offers an explanation why 
gender gap closes when competition is between groups than between 
individuals. 
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3.4.2.3 Beliefs About Absolute Performances 
Are groups better than individuals at predictLQJRWKHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHDQGKHQFH
serve as implicit informational channels? We answer this question by testing the 
equality of predicted and actual scores in quizzes across the three treatments 
(Table 4).15 Groups significantly overestimate the number of answers they got 
right whereas individuals are quite accurate in predicting their own absolute 
performance in both Individual and IndividualInfo treatments. The inaccuracy 
of the groups to predict their own score is quite surprising in the context of our 
                                                          
15
 We also investigated whether the accuracy of subjects to predict scores in a quiz changes from 
first to the second half of the experiment. We find the consistent results to the reported results 
in Table 4. 
Figure 3: Relative Confidence Rankings in Three Different Ranking 
Conditions across the Four Blocks.   
Error bars show 95% confidence intervals 
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study: since the questions were both open-ended and either very simple or very 
difficult, we would expect that all subjects would have a high degree of certainty 
about whether they knew the answer to the question or not. Predicting the 
performance of the average subject on the other hand could be more difficult as 
one should correctly predict the abilities of the subject pool in a given quiz. 
Groups perform much better at predicting performance of the average subject 
than individuals for whom we reject the hypothesis that mean difference 
between predicted and actual average score is zero (the third column of Table 
2). This result is in support for the hypothesis that groups perform as an implicit 
LQIRUPDWLRQDOFKDQQHOVDERXWRWKHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHVEXWDOVRWKDWWKH\DUHOHVV
accurate in predicting their own scores.  
 
Table 4: Testing for the Equality of Predicted Scores to Actual Scores 
in a Quiz 
 Mean Difference Own 
Score 
Mean Difference Average 
Score 
Individual 0.036 0.627*** 
IndividualInfo -0.045 0.372*** 
Group 0.122*** 0.086 
Mean Difference Own Score =  Mean (Predicted Own score ± Actual 
Score). Significances are according to two-tailed t-test. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 
1% significance levels. 
 
 
3.4.3 Explaining Entry with Beliefs  
In a strategic situation like a market entry game, we expect beliefs to be 
important determinants of behaviour. We investigate whether and if so which 
beliefs are significant predictors of entry across our treatment manipulations. In 
Table 5, we regress the binary variable of entry decision on the range of beliefs 
elicited through the round questionnaire. These are measured expectations of 
HQWU\ UDWHVRZQSHUFHQWLOH UDQNLQJVRZQVFRUH DYHUDJHVXEMHFW¶V VFRUH LQD
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quiz, own rank and the difference between own actual score: for the 
IndividualInfo treatment only we also have the historical average score. 
In a causal sense, we would predict that higher predicted entry will 
discourage entry and there will be a negative relationship between predicted 
entry and actual entry. In the Group and IndividualInfo treatments, the predicted 
entry rate significantly and positively correlates with the decision to enter a 
market. This suggests that in these two treatments, where subjects are more 
accurate in predicting actual entry rates (compared to Individual treatment; 
Table 3), the expectation about the entry rate of others was not a factor to 
strategically discourage or encourage entry decision in a round.16 A similar 
result was previously found by Camerer & Lovallo (1999) and Moore & Cain 
(2007) as well, who also show that entry decisions are affected by the beliefs 
about relative confidence and not by the expectations about entry decisions of 
others. We find that the more confident subjects were about their performance 
in a quiz, the more likely they were to enter a market in IndividualInfo and 
Group treatments (significant coefficient of Relative Confidence). We do not 
find a similar effect in the Individual treatment, although we find that subjects 
believe they obtained a lower rank when they decided to enter a market than 
when they decided to stay out.17 Looking in more detail at the pattern of relative 
confidence and entry behaviour in Figure 2 and Figure 3 across rounds and 
treatments, we see that in the Group and IndividualInfo treatments the relative 
confidence mirrors the actual entry behaviour which is another manifestation of 
                                                          
16
 We also have done additional analysis separately for each difficulty level and random rounds. 
In all, we find either no significant effect or positive correlation between expected entry rates 
and entry decisions.  
17
 Note that a lower rank means a better rank, such that ranking 1st is better than ranking 2nd.  
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the significant correlations  between relative confidence and entry behaviour in 
these two treatments but not in the Individual treatment. 
In the second column of the Table 5, we check whether experimental 
manipulation of giving subjects historical information significantly affects the 
entry decisions of individuals. We find that the greater is the difference between 
RQH¶VRZQVFRUHDQGDYHUDJHKLVWRULFDOVFRUH LQDTXL] WKHPRUH OLNHO\ LVDQ
individual to enter a market. For this treatment, we also observe a significant 
negative effect of predicted average score on entry. However, Table 4 suggests 
that individuals with information are just as accurate in predicting average 
scores in a quiz round as individuals without information. This may indicate 
that historical information manipulation in IndividualInfo treatment has primed 
individuals to take into account expectations about average performances of 
others when deciding to enter whereas in the other treatments this variable was 
not a significant predictor of entry. 
To conclude this section with summarizing the results, we observe the 
following. Different beliefs affect entry behaviour differently across treatments. 
In the Individual treatment, no other belief except expected rank significantly 
predicts entry. In the Group and IndividualInfo treatments, subjects¶ expected 
entry rates are significantly correlated with the entry behaviour. Also relative 
confidence is a significant predictor of entry behaviour, and its pattern mirrors 
the pattern of entry rates across rounds. In the IndividualInfo treatment, we 
additionally REVHUYHWKDWVXEMHFWV¶HQWU\EHKDYLRXULVVLJQLILFDQWO\SUHGLFWHGE\
expected average score. Since there is no evident under/overconfidence in the 
last two blocks of the IndividualInfo treatment (Figure 3), the predictive power 
of expected average score on entry behaviour may be the key to understanding 
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why in this treatment the BTA/WTA effect disappears both in entry and in 
relative confidence judgements in the last two blocks. 
 
 
3.5 Discussion  
More than 50% of businesses fail after three years of operating and the rate of 
failure is significantly different across industries. The highest rate of failure 
occurs in fields such as Information, Retail and Transportation/Communication 
Services and the lowest rate of failure is in the fields of Education/Health, 
Agriculture and Finance/Insurance (Statistic Brain 2012). A recent research 
agenda by Moore and his colleagues has tried to explain why these differences 
appear in markets by experimental investigation of why individuals decide to 
enter certain competitions and avoid others. They show that individuals 
underestimate their relative performance in difficult tasks and overestimate it in 
easy tasks which in turn translate into varying entry decisions to difficult and 
simple competitions.  
Table 5: Regression Analysis of Entry  
 Individual IndividualInfo Group 
Expected Entry Rate 0.025 0.131*** 0.049*** 
Relative Confidence 0.007 0.072*** 0.045*** 
Expected Own Score -0.034 0.197 0.025 
Expected Average Score 0.029 -0.092** -0.021 
Expected Own Rank -0.174*** -0.001 -0.095*** 
Difference_Info_Score  0.097***  
 
   
Other variables    
N 274 251 253 
Pseudo_R2 0.21 0.54 0.66 
Probit regression clustered by session. Reported coefficients are average 
marginal effects. Quiz rounds only * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance levels. 
'LIIHUHQFHB,QIRB6FRUH LV WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ RQH¶V RZQ VFRUH DQG WKH
information received about the average historical score in a given quiz. Other 
variables contain controls for age, gender, self-reported risk attitudes, feelings 
of confidence and competitiveness measured by post-study questionnaire. 
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Our findings contribute to this line of literature by investigating factors 
that may help to de-bias entry decisions. We have shown that the bias in entry 
behaviour is not inherent to individual decisions but that groups are prone to the 
same type of bias as well. We explored whether information helps to alleviate 
overentry and underentry to simple DQGGLIILFXOWPDUNHWV2XUDQVZHULV³<HV
LW GRHV EXW XQGHU VSHFLILF FRQGLWLRQV´ :H VKRZ WKDW JURXSV DV LPSOLFLW
information channels can, on average, SUHGLFWFRPSHWLWRUV¶HQWU\EHKDYLRXUDQG
performances better than individuals. However, being more informed about 
competitors¶V SHUIRUPDQFH does not guarantee the mitigation of the 
coordination failures in entry behaviour: groups similar to individuals over-
enter to simple rounds and under-enter to difficult rounds and fail to learn. 
*URXSV¶ HQWU\ GHFLVLRns are explained by relative confidence in their beliefs 
about percentile rankings which are not de-biased through repetition and 
feedback over the course of the experiment. We show that only explicit 
information about average historical performance in a given task eliminates the 
difference in entry behaviour and relative confidence rankings between simple 
and difficult rounds. The difference between simple and difficult rounds in this 
treatment is initially much smaller than in the other two treatments but is still 
significant in the first half of the experiment. The interaction of historical 
performance information with repetition and feedback de-biases individuals in 
both their entry decisions and relative confidence rankings in the last two 
blocks.  
An important policy recommendation following our results is that 
explicit statistical information about past performance is a useful tool to 
eliminate biased overentry and underentry to competitions. Excessive entry to 
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industries perceived as simple and insufficient entry to industries perceived as 
difficult can be overcome if the information about revenues, profits and failure 
rates (as an indicator of firm performance) are publicly available and transmitted 
to potential entrepreneurs in the initial stages of their start-up ventures. 
 Although in our study we do not find any gender differences in entry 
behaviour, many studies in the literature show that women are less willing to 
compete than men regardless of their actual performances (e.g. Barber & Odean 
2001; Niederle & Vesterlund 2010; Buser, Niederle & Oosterbeek 2012). We 
find that women are less confident than men in their relative performance 
rankings in both of our individual treatments, but this difference disappears 
when they are in groups. This may explain the increase in competitive 
preferences of women when in groups that encourages women to compete 
especially in situations where they are as skilled as men (Healy & Pate 2011; 
Dargnies 2012). As another application, for example, schools can use historical 
performance information of grades to encourage more entry of females to 
FRPSHWLWLYH VFLHQFH GHJUHHV KHOG EDFN E\ IHPDOHV¶ PLVMXGJHG UHODWLYH
performance beliefs (Buser, Niederle & Oosterbeek 2012; Dargnies 2012).    
Further research could usefully explore what mechanisms contribute to the 
emergence of this difference in relative confidence between female individuals 
and groups to provide insight into how relative confidence beliefs are formed.  
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Appendix A: Quizzes 
Simple A 
What is the capital city of Greece? 
:KRLVWKHDXWKRURIWKH³+DUU\3RWWHU´ERRNV" 
What is the name of the animated star of the computer game and movie Tomb 
Raider? 
What was the first name of Bonaparte, a French military and political leader of 
late 18th early 19thcenturies France? 
Which country, located in the northern Eurasia, is the largest country in the 
world? 
Tiebreaker:  What is the height of Eiffel Tower in metres? 
 
Simple B 
What is the capital city of Argentina? 
:KRZURWHWKHSOD\³+DPOHW´"  
:KLFKDFWUHVVSOD\HGWKHWLWOHUROHLQWKHILOP³3UHWW\:RPDQ´" 
What was the name of the admiral famously known for his part in the victory 
of Britain in the Battle of Trafalgar? 
Which river, located in Northern Africa, is the longest river in the world? 
Tiebreaker:  How many member states are there in United Nations? 
 
Simple C 
What is the capital city of France? 
:KRZURWHWKHQRYHO³7KH/LIHDQG$GYHQWXUHVRI1LFKRODV1LFNOHE\´" 
Which cartoon show included characters called Thelma and Shaggy? 
What was the name of the famous ship that left the British port of 
Southampton with the aim of reaching New York City in the United States in 
1912 but tragically sank on its Maiden Voyage? 
Which mountain peak, located in the range Himalayas, is the highest peak in 
the world? 
Tiebreaker:  How many films did Alfred Hitchcock direct (including short 
films and documentaries)? 
 
Simple D 
What is the capital city of China? 
3OHDVHFRPSOHWHWKHWLWOHRIWKH7ROVWR\¶VQRYHO³:DUDQG« 
:KDWW\SHRIDQLPDOZDV6WXDUWLQWKHILOP³6WXDUW/LWWOH´" 
Who served as a Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 2007 to 2010? 
What mountain peak, located in Scotland, is the highest peak in Britain? 
Tiebreaker:  How many men signed the American Declaration of 
Independence? 
 
Difficult A 
What is the capital city of Bahrain? 
:KRZURWHWKHQRYHO³0DVWHUDQG0DUJDULWD´" 
:KRLVWKHYRLFHRIDGXOW6LPEDLQWKHILOP³7KH/LRQ.LQJ´" 
What is the name of the Battle also known as Battle of the Nations fought in 
1813 by Russia Prussia, Austria and Sweden against Napoleon? 
Which mountain peak, located in the range of Guiana Highlands, is the highest 
peak in Brazil? 
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Tiebreaker: How many days did British-American astronaut Michael 
Foalespend in space? 
 
Difficult B 
What is the capital city of Togo?  
What Chilean author wrote Sub Terra? 
What is the real name of the actor playing the character Cramden in the 2008 
ILOP³7RH7DFWLF´" 
Who was the Prime Minister of United Kingdom from 1937 to 1940? 
Which river, with its source in the Great Slave Lake, is the longest river in 
Canada? 
Tiebreaker: How many thousands of squared kilometres is the area of 
Madagascar?   
 
Difficult C 
What is the capital city of Suriname?  
What is the surname of the German brothers known for their collections of 
IDLU\WDOHV"%URWKHUV« 
What is the real name of the actress playing Aunt Tina Little in the 1999 film 
³6WXDUW/LWWOH´" 
Who was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1905 to 1908? 
What country in Africa borders only with Senegal? 
Tiebreaker: How many thousand kilometres is the coastline of Canada? 
 
Difficult D 
What is the capital city of Russia? 
What was the surname of the liteUDU\FKDUDFWHU1DQDLQ(PLO=ROD¶VQRYHO
WLWOHG³1DQD´" 
What is the real name of the actor playing The Tin Man in the 1939 film 
³:L]DUGRI2]´" 
Who was the king of England between 1327 and 1377? 
What country surrounds two other countries? 
Tiebreaker: What year was the ex-Prime minister of United Kingdom Arthur 
Balfour born? 
 
Appendix B: Instructions for the Group Treatment 
Welcome! 
You are about to participate in an experiment.  There are 21 people participating 
in the experiment and participants have been divided into 7 groups of 3.  This 
group composition will remain fixed for the whole experiment.  You will be 
allowed to communicate with people in your group but you must not 
communicate with anyone outside your group. If you have a question at any 
time during the experiment, please raise your hand and someone will come to 
your desk to answer it. 
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The use of electronic devices such as mobile phones, music players, and tablet 
computers is strictly prohibited. Please make sure that all such devices are 
turned off and put away out of sight.  
If you break these rules, you will be excluded from the experiment without 
receiving any payment and be disqualified from future experiments with 
CeDEx.  
Market Entry Experiment 
In this experiment, your group will be playing the role of an entrepreneur who 
has to choose whether to enter into new markets.  Entering a new market can be 
highly profitable if your group does well.  On the other hand, if competition is 
too tough, your group may lose money.  The experiment will consist of a 
number of rounds. In each round, your group will make one entry decision. The 
decisions made by groups will affect your final payoff.  
Each round, market rankings will be determined in one of two ways.  In some 
rounds, the rankings of all entrants will be determined by scores on a trivia quiz.  
In other rounds, all entrants will be ranked randomly (by being assigned a 
random score).  In each round, the groups that have entered will be ranked 
according to their scores and their group members will receive payoffs 
according to this table: 
 
<RXU*URXS¶V
Rank 
Point Payoff for 
Each Member of 
1st 14 
2nd 10 
3rd 5 
4th -10 
5th -10 
6th -10 
7th -10 
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The top 3 groups who decided to enter the market will each earn points.  Higher-
ranked entrants will earn more, according to the table above.  If more than 3 
groups enter the market, the members of groups ranked below 3rd will lose 10 
points each. Your group may always choose to stay out of the market; staying 
out means you neither gain nor lose anything.  
For participating in this experiment, each of you will receive a £10 base 
payment.  In addition, you can earn points in each round as described above.  At 
the end of the experiment, three of the rounds will be randomly selected and 
your points from those three rounds will be averaged and then converted into 
cash at a rate of £1 per point.  For each of you, this amount will be added to (or, 
if you lost points, subtracted from) your £10 base payment.   
 
Appendix C: Sample Feedback Screen as seen after Round 8 
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Appendix D: Manipulation of Information Treatment 
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Appendix E: Other Results 
 
 
  
Table E1: Testing for the equality of expected to actual entry rates  
 Rounds Average  
Actual Entry 
Average 
Expected 
Entry 
p-
value 
Individual Round 1 (Simple) 5.333 3.809 .000 
 Round 2 (Random) 3.333 4.285 .000 
 Round 3 (Difficult) 1.333 3.5 .000 
 Round 4 (Simple) 5.833 4.428 .000 
 Round 5 (Random) 4.333 4.261 .767 
 Round 6 (Difficult) 1.833 3.666 .000 
 Round 7 (Simple) 5 4.476 .023 
 Round 8 (Random) 4.333 4.428 .599 
 Round 9 (Difficult) 4 3.976 .929 
 Round 10 (Simple) 5.116 4.285 .001 
 Round 11 (Random) 3.833 4.476 .012 
 Round 12 (Difficult) 2.833 3.928 .000 
 
Group
  
Round 1 (Simple) 5.833 5.642 .438 
 Round 2 (Random) 4.116 4.285 .522 
 Round 3 (Difficult) .666 2.785 .006 
 Round 4 (Simple) 6.166 5.595 .008 
 Round 5 (Random) 4.166 4.333 .493 
 Round 6 (Difficult) 2.166 3.024 .002 
 Round 7 (Simple) 4.833 5.21 .114 
 Round 8 (Random) 2.5 4.19 .000 
 Round 9 (Difficult) 4.166 3.286 .003 
 Round 10 (Simple) 5 4.95 .843 
 Round 11 (Random) 3.5 4.047 .014 
 Round 12 (Difficult) 2.833 3.357 .031 
 
Individual
Info 
 
Round 1 (Simple) 
 
4.666 
 
4.833 
 
.492 
 Round 2 (Random) 3.5 3.904 .133 
 Round 3 (Difficult) 2 2.57 .003 
 Round 4 (Simple) 5 4.761 .229 
 Round 5 (Random) 3.833 3.857 .921 
 Round 6 (Difficult) 2.5 2.76 .433 
 Round 7 (Simple) 4.333 5.047 .000 
 Round 8 (Random) 3.4 4.457 .000 
 Round 9 (Difficult ) 3.833 3.071 .000 
 Round 10 (Simple) 3.66 4.619 .000 
 Round 11 (Random) 3.8333 4.119 .116 
 Round 12 (Difficult) 4 3.191 .000 
For each round there are 42 observations. p-values are from two tailed t-test 
  
87 
 
CHAPTER 4: SNOWBALLING CONFIDENCE IN 
HIERARCHICAL TOURNAMENTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Confidence about own ability relative to others has important effects on many 
economic decisions such as job search, entrepreneurial activity and effort 
choices in competitive settings. In this paper, we study confidence in the context 
of a three-stage hierarchical tournament, in which top (bottom) scorers of a 
group are matched with the top (bottom) scorers of another group as the 
tournament progresses from one stage to the next. The construct of a 
hierarchical tournament allows us to study whether subjects adjust their 
confidence levels according to the reference group they are competing against. 
Learning that one is a top scorer of his group is a positive signal of his relative 
ability with respect to the bottom scorers of his group. However, in the new 
stage top scorers matched together have all received the same positive signal. 
We explore the conjecture that people may underweight this observation, and 
as a consequence their confidence may increase from one stage of the 
tournament to the next, snowballing their confidence. The opposite may be true 
for bottom scorers who move down the tournament ladder and are matched with 
the other bottom scorers. To our knowledge, ours is the first study on confidence 
snowballing in a tournament setting.   
There are many real life settings where confidence snowballing may be 
evident. Educational attainment is a good example where confidence 
judgements are decisive and may play an important role on how much effort 
students spend: a first year student at an elite university will be overconfident if 
he ignores the change in the difficulty of the new competition from his high 
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school to university, and this may even strengthen further if he proceeds to 
highly selective graduate schools. Another example is managerial 
overconfidence: the promotion tracks and corporate governance policies in 
themselves may give origins to managerial overconfidence and explain the 
widely cited phenomenon in the literature of CEO overconfidence (e.g. Paredes 
2005; Malmendier & Tate 2005; Malmendier & Tate 2008; Brown & Sarma 
2007; Galasso & Simcoe 2011). The opposite can be true for the losers of 
tournaments that enter consolation tournaments against other losers. Recently 
fired workers may be underconfident competing for newly posted positions if 
they neglect how easy the new competition is, and hence may exert suboptimal 
effort to job search (Dubra 2004; Koszegi 2006).   
The previous literature, which we discuss in Section 2, has studied 
confidence mostly within the context of single stage tournaments and contests 
(Niederle & Vesterlund 2007; Moore & Cain 2007; Ludwig, Wickhardt & 
Wickhorst 2011) and has not looked how confidence evolves through stages. 
Only a small strand of the literature investigates the effect of feedback on 
confidence (Eberlein, Ludwig and Nafziger 2010; Mobius, Niederle, Niehaus 
& Rosenblat 2011; Grossman & Owens 2012; Eil & Rao 2011), but even here 
the environment is very different from ours since the reference group one 
compares himself to does not change from one stage to the next.  
To study confidence snowballing we develop a three stage hierarchical 
tournament where in each stage subjects perform a skill task. The skill task 
involved seeing a pair of black circles with white dots for 1 second and judging 
which circle had more dots in it. This task has been previously used to study 
absolute confidence calibration individuals by Hollard, Massoni & Vergnaud 
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(2010) and Massoni & Roux (2012). By manipulating the difference in the 
number of dots, we run easy and difficult tasks as a between subject treatment. 
On each stage subjects are grouped with others who have received similar 
feedback about their relative performances in previous stages, and before 
performing the task, we elicit their relative confidence levels. We elicit their 
confidence levels with an incentive compatible device that has a clear 
behavioural interpretation of confidence ± a subjective probability a person 
assigns to being in the top half of his group.  Section 3 describes our 
experimental design and procedures in more detail.  
In Section 4 we present our findings. In the first stage of the tournament, 
we observe neither overconfidence nor underconfidence: on average subjects 
assess their likelihood of being in the top half as fifty percent. As the tournament 
progresses to later stages however, we observe asymmetric change in 
confidence between top and bottom scorers. By the last stage of the tournament, 
top scorers matched in a group with the other top scorers significantly increase 
their confidence both in easy and difficult tasks. Bottom scorers matched in a 
group with the other bottom scorers significantly decrease their confidence in 
the difficult but not in the easy task. We do not find any gender differences in 
terms of either performance or confidence, but we do find interesting gender 
differences in how top and bottom scorers attribute their success to skill or luck. 
Men top scorers perceive the task as significantly more a skill than a luck task 
compared to men bottom scorers, whereas we cannot tell the same about the 
women top and bottom scorers. Section 5 discusses the implications of our 
findings, possible further research directions and concludes.  
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4.2 Literature Review  
In this paper, we study relative confidence and more specifically the subjective 
probability a person assigns to being in the top half of his group. The previous 
experimental economics literature has studied relative confidence within the 
VHWWLQJV RI WRXUQDPHQWV DQG FRQWHVWV ZKHUH EHOLHIV DERXW RQH¶V FKDQFHV RI
success can determine whether to enter a competition, how much effort to exert 
when competing, what strategies to use while competing and if and when to 
leave a competition. It has been shown that people tend to be overconfident 
relative to others and bet on themselves more in easy and familiar tasks and are 
underconfident relative to others in difficult and non-familiar tasks (Hoelzl & 
Rustichini 2005; Moore 2007; Moore and Cain 2007; chapter 3); females are 
less confident than males and enter competitions less often (Niederle & 
Vesterlund 2007; Dargnies 2012; Kamas & Preston 2012); being overconfident 
increases exerted effort in contests and hence the chance of winning (Ludwig, 
Wichardt & Wickhorst 2011) and people tend to neglect competition when 
making  tournament entry decisions (Camerer & Lovallo 1999; Radzevick & 
Moore 2008). In our study, by manipulating the difficulty level of a task as a 
between subject treatment variable, we test for the presence of 
over/underconfidence with a novel incentivized elicitation device and more 
importantly how confidence changes from one stage of a hierarchical 
tournament to another.    
Two leading explanations have been given in the literature for why 
BTA/WTA effect occurs. One is asserting that, in competitive situations, people 
neglect the competition and focus on themselves. Camerer & Lovallo (1999) 
propose a reference group neglect hypothesis - ³the tendency to underadjust to 
FKDQJHVLQWKHUHIHUHQFHJURXSRQHFRPSHWHVDJDLQVW´WRH[SODLQRYHUHQWU\WR
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tournaments. The main support for their hypothesis was the observation that 
trivia experts recruited to compete against each other were more overconfident 
than the general student sample- indicating that subjects took into account their 
own knowledge and competence and ignored that of the competition. Moore 
and his colleagues in a series of papers introduce an alternative but related - 
differential information hypothesis to explain their findings of overentry to easy 
and underentry to difficult competitive tasks (Moore & Cain 2007; Radzevick 
& Moore 2008; Moore & Small 2007). They argue that because there is greater 
accessibility and quality of information about the self than about others people 
make more regressive estimates about others which leads them to further 
underweight those regressive estimates.18 Differential information hypothesis 
aims to explain reference group neglect hypothesis by asserting that people tend 
WRQHJOHFWFRPSHWLWLRQEHFDXVHWKH\GRQ¶WKDYHHQRXJKLQIRUPDWLRQWREDVHWKHLU
decision on. With our experimental design we will be able to partly disentangle 
these two hypotheses because the differential information hypothesis predicts 
no change in confidence since in the new stage there is symmetric information 
about self and reference group and reference group neglect hypothesis predicts 
that subjects will disregard the information about others and hence confidence 
will snowball.  
Our study is also related to the literature investigating how confidence 
is affected by feedback. When competing against the same opponent repeatedly, 
subjects learn to calibrate their confidence levels with the help of feedback but 
                                                          
18
 Both hypotheses are based on a broader finding that self is evaluated more egocentrically 
compared to others. This could be due to a number of reasons such as self being a natural focal 
point (Kruger & Burrus 2004), superior memory for the self-related events (Symons & Johnson 
1997), motivational reasons (Benabou & Tirole 2002; Koszegi 2006) and insufficient anchoring 
and adjustment to shared circumstances between self and others (Windschitl, Kruger & Simms 
2003). 
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only given explicit infoUPDWLRQDERXWRWKHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHV5RVH	:LQGVFKLWO
2008; Moore & Cain 2007; Chapter 3 of this dissertation). When feedback is 
noisy, people overweight positive feedback, update both their absolute and 
relative confidences insufficiently for negative feedback (Mobius, Niederle, 
Niehaus & Rosenblat 2011; Grossman & Owens 2012) and exhibit dislike or 
indifference to new information when expecting negative feedback (Eil & Rao 
2011, Burks, Carpenter, Goette & Rustichini 2010). There is also heterogeneity 
among subjects on how they react to feedback, some refusing to update their 
relative confidence and some overreacting to the feedback (Eberlein, Ludwig & 
Nafziger 2010). In our study, subjects are given feedback both about their own 
DQGWKHLUJURXSPHPEHUV¶UHODWLYHSHUIRUPDQFHDWHDFKVWDJHRIWKHWRXUQDPHQW
to investigate how people update their relative confidence from one stage to the 
next. Positive and negative feedback may differently affect confidence because 
of the self-serving attribution bias which has been extensively studied in the 
psychology literature. It has been shown that people tend to attribute positive 
feedback to internal factors such as their skill and abilities and negative 
feedback to external factors such as luck and destiny (Arkin, Appelman & 
Burger 1980; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt & Schimel 2004) and 
tend to rate a task they succeeded at as more important than a task they failed at 
(von Hippel, Lakin & Shakarchi 2005). In our study, we ask subjects about their 
perceptions of the task in a post study questionnaire in order to ascertain whether 
self-serving bias might explain observed changes of confidence.  
Finally, our study is related to previous studies of behavioural anomalies 
such as the ³KRWKDQG´IDOODF\DQGJDPEOHU¶VIDOODF\. These have been studied 
in real world sports tournaments investigating betting behaviour and 
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performance in basketball, golf and bowling showing that players believe that 
DIWHUZLQQLQJWKH\KDYHPRUHFKDQFHRIZLQQLQJEHFDXVHWKH\DUHKDYLQJD³KRW
KDQG´RUWKDWSHRSOHWHQGWREHWRQWKHRXWFRPHVWKDWKDYHQRWRFFXUUHGEHIRUH
in a series of random choices (Camerer 1989; Livingston 2012; Abrevaya 2002). 
In our study we will check whether winners will increase their confidence after 
winning even if they know that the task is of a random nature. One of the studies 
to explicitly study confidence in a real world tournament setting is by Park & 
Santos-Pinto (2010) where the authors elicit confidence of participants in the 
form of forecasts of ranks in chess and poker tournaments differentiating 
tournaments as more skill and more luck based, respectively. Our study 
complements the existing field studies by controlling for self-selection into 
different tournament types, and also by systematically measuring and tracking 
confidence at each stage of the tournament and eliminating any other confounds 
of effort.  
Based on these previous literatures, we can posit a number of 
hypotheses.  We hypothesize that subjects will be overconfident in easy and 
underconfident in difficult tasks in the first stage of the tournament, consistent 
with the existing empirical evidence of BTA/WTA effect. We hypothesize that 
as top and bottom scorers get feedback about their relative performances and 
are matched with the other top and bottom scorers, confidence of top scorers 
will increase and that of bottom scorers will decrease. This hypothesis of 
snowballing is based on the evidence of egocentric valuations of the self found 
in other settings. Finally we hypothesize that top and bottom half scorers will 
update their confidence asymmetrically due to self-serving attribution bias.  
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4.3 Experimental Design  
The experiment consisted of three stages. At each stage, 16 participants were 
divided into four groups. Before the 1st stage began, subjects were read 
instructions and informed that they will be completing a set of Circle tasks 
where their performance will affect their earnings. The Circle task (adapted 
from Hollard, Massoni & Vergnaud 2010; Massoni & Roux 2012) involved 
seeing a pair of black circles with white dots in them for 1 second and judging 
which circle had more dots. One of the circles had 50 dots and the other had 
either 51 (difficult task) or 70 (easy task) dots (see Figure 1). The easy and 
difficult tasks were a between subject treatment manipulation to check for the 
BTA/WTA effect and how differently confidence snowballs when performance 
in a task is low versus high in absolute terms. To control for potential cross 
contamination between confidence, effort and performance, we aimed to have 
a skill rather than an effort task. Hence, we pre-tested the task to calibrate for 
difficulty levels and evaluate the role of effort. The results of the pre-test 
showed that (i) performance varied across individuals, (ii) did not show any 
evidence of learning across stages and (iii) varying incentive levels (£0.05 
versus £0.50 per correct answer) did not affect performance.19 The latter finding 
in particular convinced us that effort plays a minimal role in performance. 
 
                                                          
19
 We discuss the task and further results of the pre-test in more detail in the Appendix A. 
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After receiving the instructions describing the Circle task, subjects had 
a chance to practice the task on their computer terminals. One set of the Circle 
task involved 20 pairs of circles with a known dot difference (either 50/51 or 
50/70, varied across sessions as a between subject treatment variable). The 
purpose of the practice set was to introduce the task to the subjects. We did not 
give any feedback to subjects about the performance in the practice set. After 
the practice set, the rest of the instructions were read to subjects and Stage 1 
began.20  
Each stage consisted of explaining to subjects what group they were in, 
filling out the confidence elicitation table, completing the Circle task and 
receiving relative performance feedback. In Stage 1, four groups of four subjects 
were randomly formed. Subjects were told which group they were in (Group A, 
B, C or D) and that they would all be completing the same Circle task similar to 
the practice set. Before proceeding to the Circle task, they were asked to 
complete a table as in Figure 2 which served as our confidence elicitation tool. 
The tool infers confidence from observed choices subjects make and has a clear 
behavioural interpretation of what subjective probability a person assigns to 
                                                          
20
 The instructions can be found in the Appendix B. 
50/51 Dots: Difficult task 50/70 Dots: Easy task 
Figure 1: The Circle Task 
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being in the top half of his group. For every row of the table subjects had to 
make a choice between Option A and Option B. Option A paid off £10 if a 
person was one of the top two scorers of his group in that stage and £3 if he was 
one of the bottom two scorers of his group in that stage. Option B was a lottery 
which paid either £10 or £3 with the chance of £10 progressively decreasing 
down the rows. The row where a subject switched from choosing Option B to 
Option A is our measure of confidence that he will be in the top two of his 
group.21 This is incentive compatible under both EU and prospect theoretic 
models of choice under risk and so is independent of individual risk attitudes.22 
A person who thinks that he has an equal chance of being in the top or bottom 
two of his group will switch in the middle of the table and we say he has 50% 
confidence. Any deviation from switching in the middle of the table indicates 
whether a person assigns higher or lower probability to being in the top half of 
his group. 23 
After subjects filled in the confidence elicitation table at the beginning 
of a stage, they completed the Circle task that determined their performance in 
that stage. Each correct answer earned them £0.50 so that they could earn up to 
£10. When all subjects had completed the Circle task, they received feedback 
about whether they were in the top or bottom of their groups. They were then 
regrouped according to their performances for the next stage.24 The grouping at 
                                                          
21
 We eliminated the possibility of double switching by not letting subjects proceed to the next 
screen and asking them to modify their choices if they switched more than once.  
22
 A similar procedure has been previously used by Urbig, Stauf & Weitzel (2009) to elicit 
absolute and relative confidence levels. 
23
 It can be argued that ambiguity attitudes can affect the choice in the elicitation procedure. 
However this is tangential to our analysis assuming that ambiguity attitudes are inherently part 
of any confidence measure and are constant within an individual and we are specifically 
interested in the change of confidence within individual. 
24
 7KH IHHGEDFN UHDGDV³<RXZHUH LQ WKH723%27720WZRRI\RXUJURXS´DQG WKHQH[W
screen informed them of their new groups and reminded them of how the regrouping was done.  
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each stage is displayed in Figure 3 and was common knowledge for all subjects 
before the experiment began. They were reminded about the grouping at the 
beginning of each stage to make sure they understand who they were in a group 
with.  
 
 
At the end of the experiment subjects filled out a post study 
questionnaire about demographics, personality measures and beliefs, after 
which the experimenter approached each subject with randomization devices to 
determine according to which stage/part/row a subject would be paid for.25 The 
random incentive procedure either paid for the performance in the Circle task 
or confidence elicitation table to control for the hedging opportunities between 
                                                          
25
 We used physical randomization devices such as a 6-sided and a 20-sided dice and numbered 
balls to make the independence of the randomization procedure to subjects as clear as possible.  
Row Option A: 
Bet 
Your Choice Option B: Lottery 
1 
You get 
£10 if you 
are one of 
the top two 
scorers of 
you group 
and  
£3 if you 
are one of 
the bottom 
two scorers 
of your 
group 
A R      R B £10 with 100% chance 
2 A R      R B £10 with 95% chance and £3 with 5% chance 
3 A R      R B £10 with 90% chance and £3 with 10% chance 
4 A R      R B £10 with 85% chance and £3 with 15% chance 
5 A R      R B £10 with 80% chance and £3 with 20% chance 
6 A R      R B £10 with 75% chance and £3 with 25% chance 
7 A R      R B £10 with 70% chance and £3 with 30% chance 
8 A R      R B £10 with 65% chance and £3 with 35% chance 
9 A R      R B £10 with 60% chance and £3 with 40% chance 
10 A R      R B £10 with 55% chance and £3 with 45% chance 
11 A R      R B £10 with 50% chance and £3 with 50% chance 
12 A R      R B £10 with 45% chance and £3 with 55% chance 
13 A R      R B £10 with 40% chance and £3 with 60% chance 
14 A R      R B £10 with 35% chance and £3 with 65% chance 
15 A R      R B £10 with 30% chance and £3 with 70% chance 
16 A R      R B £10 with 25% chance and £3 with 75% chance 
17 A R      R B £10 with 20% chance and £3 with 80% chance 
18 A R      R B £10 with 15% chance and £3 with 85% chance 
19 A R      R B £10 with 10% chance and £3 with 90% chance 
20 A R      R B £10 with 5% chance and £3 with 95% chance 
 
Figure 2: Confidence Elicitation Table 
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these two parts.26 Subjects were undergraduate and postgraduate students 
recruited via Orsee (Greiner 2004) from an online database of CeDEx lab at the 
University of Nottingham. There were 192 subjects divided into two treatments 
with 6 sessions per treatment. The subjects were 51% female from various 
disciplines with 22% from Economics and Business majors. The experiment 
was fully computerized using the software Ztree (Fischbacher 2007) and lasted 
around 30 minutes. An average payment to a subject was £7.60 ranging from 
£3 to £10.  
 
 
                                                          
26
 The control question in our post study questionnaire also confirms the non-existence of 
intentional underperformance or hedging between performance and belief elicitation.   
Figure 3: The Stages and Groupings in the Experimental Session 
Stage 3 
Group CD 
TOP 
Group ABCD 
BOTTOMTOP 
Group ABCD 
BOTTOMBOTTOM 
Group AB 
BOTTOM 
Stage 2 
Stage 2 
Group A Stage 1 Group B Group C Group D 
Group CD 
BOTTOM 
Group AB 
TOP 
Group ABCD 
TOPTOP   
 Group ABCD 
TOPBOTTOM 
Stage 3 
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4.4 Results  
We first present our findings about how confident our subjects were in the first 
stage of the tournament across difficulty levels and hence checking for 
overconfidence in easy and underconfidence in difficult tasks (difficulty effect). 
In Section 4.4.2., we present evidence for if confidence snowballs from one 
stage to another and whether there are differences between difficulty levels. 
Finally in Section 4.4.3, we will check whether top and bottom scorers have 
differing perceptions of the task, more specifically whether they perceive the 
task more skill or a luck task.  
4.4.1. Stage 1 Confidence Levels and the Difficulty Effect 
Previous relative confidence elicitation mechanisms in the literature usually ask 
subjects for their relative percentile rankings, point estimates of performance 
for self and others, or infer confidence from observed entry behaviour into 
competitions. The usual finding is that people are overconfident in easy and 
underconfident in difficult tasks (Moore 2007; Chapter 3 of this dissertation). 
We elicit relative confidence with a choice list and interpret the switch point as 
a subjective probability subject assigns to being in the top half of his group.  
The histograms of Stage 1 confidence presented in Figure 4 shows the 
following. (i) Although the modal confidence is 50% in both treatments, the 
distribution in the Easy treatment appears slightly skewed to the right. 
Comparing distributions across two treatments, we observe slightly higher 
confidence for the Easy treatment compared to the Difficult treatment 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value = 0.061). (ii) Examining averages, we find mild 
overconfidence in the Easy treatment: the average subjective probability 
subjects assign to being in the top half is 53.1% (Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value = 
0.098). In the difficult treatment, we do not find any evidence of 
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underconfidence: the average subjective probability that subjects assign to 
being in the top half is 48.9%, which is not significantly different from 50% 
(Wilcoxon sign rank p-value=0.741).  
This result is interesting as it contributes to the debate in the 
overconfidence literature of how elicitation devices, incentives and the nature 
of tasks can affect the degree of observed over/underconfidence. Eliciting 
relative confidence with our novel elicitation device, we observe a bias only in 
average level data in the easy treatment. We conjecture that this is due to 
features of elicitation device or the type of the task used which we further 
discuss in the discussion section of the paper. 
To further test for the difficulty effect, we compare average confidence 
levels between Easy and Difficult treatments for each type of subject depending 
on whether they were top or bottom in one stage or another (Table 1).  Overall, 
we find lower levels of confidence for the difficult than for the easy task and, in 
5 out of 7 cases the difference is significant at a 10% level.  
 
 
Table 1: Testing for Difficulty Effect for Each Group Type  
Average Confidence n Difficult Easy p-value 
Stage 1  96 49.0 53.1 0.061 
Stage 2 ± Top 48 54.1 60.5 0.015 
Stage 2 ± Bottom  48 44.5 43.2 0.095 
Stage 3 ± TopBottom  24 54.6 45 0.135 
Stage 3 ± BottomTop  24 55 56.3 0.519 
Stage 3 ± TopTop  24 57.1 64.6 0.063 
Stage 3 -- BottomBottom 24 32.5 45.8 0.058 
p-values are from Wilcoxon rank sum test 
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4.4.2. Snowballing of Confidence 
Our main purpose is to investigate whether and, if so how, confidence snowballs 
as one moves up or down a tournament ladder. Table 2 reports how VXEMHFWV¶ 
confidence changes from one stage to the next after a positive feedback (being 
in a top half) or after a negative feedback (being in a bottom half of his group). 
The reported numbers are average elicited confidence levels at each stage for 
the subjects who were in the relevant group: for example, Top1 are the subjects 
who were in the top half of their group in Stage 1 and TopBottom1-2 are the 
subjects who were in a Top group in Stage 1 and in a Bottom group in Stage 2. 
We observe a significant effect of positive feedback from first stage to the 
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Figure 4: The Distribution of the Elicited Confidence in 
Stage 1 of the Tournament 
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second stage: average confidence of top scorers increased significantly from 
50.3% to 54.1% in the difficult treatment and from 52.6% to 60.5% in the easy 
treatment. The change of confidence of bottom scorers from Stage 1 to Stage 2 
is significantly negative: average confidence decreases from 47.6% to 44.5% in 
the difficult treatment and from 53.6% to 43.2% in the Easy treatment. Looking 
at the change of confidence through all three stages we note the following: 
subjects react to the feedback received in the previous stage significantly 
decreasing confidence after receiving negative feedback and increasing 
confidence after receiving positive feedback (except the TopBottom subjects in 
the difficult and the BottomBottom subjects in the easy treatment). Hence, we 
conclude that it is the last feedback that subjects receive which matters in the 
formation of the next stage confidence levels. Snowballing of confidence is 
particularly evident when a subject receives only positive or negative feedback 
in all past stages. 
 
Table 2: Confidence Levels Across Stages 
Difficult n Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage1-2 
p-value 
Stage2-3 
p-value 
Top1 48 50.3% 54.1%  0.005  
Bottom1 48 47.6% 44.5%  0.009  
TopBottom1-2 24  54.6% 54.6%  0.747 
BottomTop1-2 24  45% 55%  0.003 
TopTop1-2 24  53.5% 57.1%  0.017 
BottomBottom1-2 24  44.0% 32.5%  0.003 
Easy n Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage1-2 
p-value 
Stage2-3 
p-value 
Top1 48 52.6% 60.5%  0.001  
Bottom1 48 53.6% 43.2%  0.000  
TopBottom1-2 24  61.5% 45%  0.002 
BottomTop1-2 24  39.4% 56.3%  0.024 
TopTop1-2 24  59.6% 64.6%  0.005 
BottomBottom1-2 24  47.1% 45.8%  0.371 
The p-values are from Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test.  
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Figure 5 shows the plot of confidence across stages of absolute top and 
absolute bottom scorers i.e. those subjects who ended up in the groups TopTop 
and BottomBottom in Stage 3. We test for a significant trend from one stage to 
the other with a non-parametric test developed by Cuzick (1985). We find that 
the trend in panel (a) of Figure 5 is significantly positive for the top scorers 
(p=0.015) and significantly negative for the bottom scorers (p=0.003). In panel 
(b) of Figure 5, we find a significant positive trend in the confidence of top 
scorers (p=0.007) but no significant trend in the confidence of bottom scorers 
(p=0.156). This result is consistent with the results reported in Table 2 of 
upward confidence snowballing for the top scorers and downward confidence 
snowballing for the bottom scorers only in the difficult task.  
To test the robustness of our results, we test the equality of average 
confidence of absolute top and bottom scorers for each stage of the tournament 
(Table 3). We find that at Stage 1, top and bottom scorers do not have 
significantly different confidence levels either in the easy or in the difficult 
treatments. The confidence between top and bottom scorers diverges starting 
from Stage 2 such that top scorers always have significantly higher confidence 
than bottom scorers.  
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Table 3: Confidence Across Stages of Top and Bottom Scorers 
 Difficult Easy 
 
TopTop Bottom
Bottom 
p-value TopTop Bottom
Bottom 
p-value 
Stage 1 
Confidence 
 
48.3% 
 (11.9) 
 
49.6% 
 (18.7) 
 
0.715 
 
54.2% 
(54.2) 
 
49.6%  
(20.4) 
 
0.786 
Stage 2 
Confidence 
 
53.5% 
(13.7) 
 
44% 
(17.8) 
 
0.019 
 
59.6% 
(17.2) 
 
47.1% 
(21.2) 
 
0.005 
Stage 3 
Confidence 
 
57.1% 
(14.8) 
 
32.5% 
(23.7) 
 
0.000 
 
64.6% 
(19.3) 
 
45.8% 
(25.1) 
 
0.001 
Standard deviations are in parenthesis, p-values are from Wilcoxon ranksum 
test, n=24 
Figure 5: Snowballing of Confidence of Absolute Top and Bottom 
Scorers (n = 24 per each data point)  
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4.4.3. Self-Serving Attribution Biases and Gender 
Do absolute top scorers perceive the task differently from absolute bottom 
scorers? In a post-VWXG\TXHVWLRQQDLUHZHDVNHGRXUVXEMHFWV³2QDVFDOHRI
to 7, did luck or skill determine your performance in the Circle task? (1 
FRPSOHWHO\OXFNFRPSOHWHO\VNLOO´. In Table 4, we test the equality of reported 
perceptions about the task between top and bottom scorers to test for self-
serving biases in the attribution of causality of successes and failures. Top 
scorers reported that it was skill rather than luck that determined their results in 
a task (score of 3.25 in Difficult and 5.79 in Easy treatment) compared to the 
ERWWRPVFRUHUV¶UHSRUWVVFRUHRILQ'LIILFXOWDQG4 in Easy). We hence 
find a significant effect supporting the hypothesis that subjects attribute success 
to own dispositions (such as skill) and failures to external forces (such as luck). 
One might argue that the observed effect was due to bottom scorers 
getting discouraged by Stage 3 and hence decreasing their effort by performing 
randomly (not trying) in the Circle task. However, we do not observe this; 
performance does not decrease across stages for bottom scorers and even 
slightly increases in the difficult treatment (from 9.4 to 10.6 in difficult, 
Wilcoxon sign rank p=0.345 and from 18.5 to 18.6 in easy, p=0.784).  
Moreover, since subjects were incentivized by a piece rate in the circle task, it 
is highly unlikely that they would be willing to sacrifice their performance by 
not trying hard enough in the Circle task.  
A further investigation of the result that top scorers perceive the task as 
more skill than a luck task compared to bottom scorers revealed that this 
difference is strongly significant for males only (p = 0.009 in the Difficult and 
p = 0.000 in the Easy treatment). For females the result is less clear: there is no 
difference between top and bottom scorers at 5% significance level (p = 0.221 
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in the Difficult and p=0.072 in the Easy treatment). This result is consistent with 
the existing literature, which has previously found that women tend to attribute 
successes to external and failures to internal causes compared to men (e.g. 
Feather 1969 and Frieze, Whitley Jr, Hanusa, & McHugh 1982; Mezulis, 
Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin 2004). This observation was partly scrutinized by 
Niederle & Yestrumskas (2008) speculating that the differences between 
JHQGHUV¶FKRLFHRIWDVNVcould be driven by the fact that women may attribute 
success to luck, and failure to ability, and the other way around for men. We 
also test whether performance and confidence levels are different between 
males and females across stages and within top and bottom scorers: we do not 
find that any significant difference either in performance or in confidence. The 
only gender difference was in causal attributions of successes and failures which 
could be one of the underlying psychological causes for the gender difference 
in entry to competitions independent of confidence and performance.  
 
Table 4: Biases in Perception of the Task between Top and 
Bottom Scorers 
 Difficult Easy 
TopTop 3.25 5.79 
 
(1.85) (1.49) 
BottomBottom 1.88 4.04 
 
(1.29) (1.32) 
p 0.004 0.000 
0HDQDQVZHUVRIWRSDQGERWWRPVFRUHUVWRWKHTXHVWLRQ³2QDVFDOH
of 1 to 7, did luck or skill determine your performance in the Circle 
task? (1-entirely luck, 7-HQWLUHO\VNLOO´6WDQGDUGdeviations are in 
parenthesis, reported p-values are from Wilcoxon rank sum test 
 
4.5 Discussion 
In their seminal paper, Camerer & Lovallo (1999) introduced the concept of 
overconfidence into the economics literature to explain entrepreneurial 
overentry to markets and high failure rates. They proposed a hypothesis of 
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³UHIHUHQFH JURXS QHJOHFW´ FRQMHFWXULQJ WKDW ZKHQ GHFLGLQJ WR HQWHU D
competition people only focus on their own performance and neglect that of the 
competition. A related and complePHQWDU\ K\SRWKHVLV RI ³GLIIHUHQWLDO
LQIRUPDWLRQ´ZDVSURSRVHGLQVHYHUDOSDSHUVE\'RQ0RRUHDQGKLVFROOHDJXHV. 
They DUJXHWKDWVXEMHFWV¶UHODWLYHFRQILGHQFHMXGJHPHQWVUHJUHVVWRZDUGVWKHLU
own absolute performances because they have more information about 
themselves than about others. Our study enables us to partially distinguish 
between these two hypotheses. In our setting, subjects have symmetric 
information about their own past relative performance and the performance of 
those who are in their reference group. We find support for the reference group 
neglect hypothesis: confidence snowballs from one stage to the other as people 
receive positive or negative performance feedback about themselves neglecting 
the information about others in his current group. More specifically, we find 
that confidence of top scorers increased from one stage to the next in both easy 
and difficult task treatments and that of bottom scorers decreased in the difficult 
but not in the easy treatment. The differential information hypothesis cannot 
account for this observation of snowballing confidence as it would predict no 
change in confidence because of the symmetric information one receives about 
self and others.  
 We check for overconfidence and underconfidence in easy and difficult 
task treatments. The usual finding in the literature is overconfidence in easy and 
familiar tasks and underconfidence in difficult and unfamiliar tasks. In the first 
stage of the tournament, we find that there is mild overconfidence in the easy 
treatment and no underconfidence in the difficult treatment where on average 
subjects assign 50% confidence to being in top of their groups. We conjecture 
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that these results are partly due to our confidence elicitation tool which is a 
colder and more cognitive incentivized elicitation device than non-incentivized 
self-reports. We also conjecture that these results are partly due to the nature of 
the task which was initially unfamiliar to the majority of our subjects and may 
KDYHFDXVHGPRUHXQFHUWDLQFRQILGHQFHMXGJHPHQWVZKLFKUHVXOWHGLQD³ILIW\-
ILIW\´FRQILGHQFHof being in the top half of the group.27 Further investigation is 
needed to answer whether it is the task type or elicitation device that results in 
well calibration of relative confidence in Stage 1 than what has been found in 
previous psychology and experimental economics literature. Interestingly, in 
the later stages, after subjects receive initial feedback about their relative 
performances we do find results in line with previous literature that sbjects are 
more confident in the easy than in the difficult task. 
 Another interesting finding of our study is that subjects perceive the task 
differently, depending on whether they ended up being in the top or bottom 
scoring groups. Top scorers rate the task more a skill task than a luck task and 
bottom scorers do the opposite. This is another manifestation of causal 
attribution bias which suggests that people tend to attribute their success to 
internal factors (such as skill) and failures to external factors (such as luck). 
This may explain why confidence snowballing happens in the first place and 
why upwards snowballing is more robust than the downward snowballing. Thus 
our finding provides an example where feedback worsens calibration rather than 
helps it and makes subjects over/underconfident. We find an interesting gender 
difference in the attribution bias. While males exhibit the bias, females do not 
                                                          
27
 Clark & Friesen (2009) also show evidence of accurate calibration in the two initially 
unfamiliar computerized tasks.   
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differ in their perceptions of the task as a skill or luck task depending on them 
being in the top or bottom scoring groups. Observing gender difference in causal 
attribution bias in our setting has an important implication for real world settings 
where corporate governance policies can cause overconfidence of male 
managers more than of female ones which can further be aggravated by self-
selection to managerial positions by more confidence males as well as by 
reference group neglect.  
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Appendix A: The Circle Task 
The Circle task has been used previously in Hollard, Massoni & Vergnaud 
(2010) and Massoni & Roux (2012) to study calibration between absolute 
confidence and success rates. The task involved seeing a pair of black circles 
with white dots in them for one second and judging which circle had more dots: 
a set of tasks comprised of 20 pairs of circles. We were specifically attracted to 
this task because we wanted to measure confidence in a ³skill´ rather than 
³effort´ task. As a skill task it would require a minimum effort level to achieve 
the maximum performance after which additional effort would not improve 
performance. We also aimed for a task that was gender neutral both in 
performance and in perceptions about the task. We pre-tested the task for these 
properties in a standard experimental session format with subjects recruited via 
Orsee (Greiner 2004) to the lab and completing the task on computer terminals 
programmed with Ztree (Fischbacher 2007). The pre-test was conducted one 
month prior to the main study.  
Four difficulty levels of a task were pretested: 50/51, 50/55, 50/60, 
50/65, 50/70 dot circles. We randomized the order in which they were presented 
to subjects. We also presented two of the difficulty levels (50/51 and 50/60) to 
subjects three times, in order to check whether there were learning effects. We 
had two between subject treatments, low and high incentives, to check whether 
additional effort improves performance. Subjects were paid for one randomly 
selected set. In low incentive scheme were paid £0.05 per correct answer plus a 
fixed payment of £5. The high incentive scheme paid £0.50 per correct answer.  
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In none of the difficulty levels, do we find difference in performance 
between the two incentive levels.28 The maximum performance was in 50/70 
dot circles (19.81 in low and 19.75 in high incentive, Wilcoxon ranksum 
p=0.729) and the minimum performance was in 50/51 dot circles (11.3 in low 
and 10.9 in high incentive, Wilcoxon ranksum p=0.437) and hence we chose 
these two difficulty levels as our easy and difficult tasks for the main 
experiment. We also test for learning effects in our pre-test data and find that 
performance within a difficulty level does not improve from earlier to later sets 
(Cuzick (1985) test for trend p=0.432).  
 
Table A1: Performance at Each Difficulty and Incentive Level 
Difficulty Level High Pay Low Pay p-value 
50/51 10.9 11.3 0.437 
50/55 15.0 15.0 0.941 
50/60 18.1 18.2 0.767 
50/65 19.0 19.7 0.119 
50/70 19.8 19.8 0.729 
p-values are from Wilcoxon ranksum test 
 
Previous studies have presented mixed evidence of whether task type 
EHLQJSHUFHLYHGWREH³IHPDOH´RU³PDOH´LQQDWXUHFDQDIIHFWFRQILGHQFHOHYHOV
between genders (Grosse & Riener 2010; Cardenas, Dreber, Essen & Ranehill 
2011; Gunther, Ekinci, Schwieren & Strobel 2010). To avoid a possible 
contamination of gender effects in our study we checked whether there were 
differences in performance, response times, and perceptions about the difficulty 
level of the task across genders. To check for the perceptions about the tasks we 
asked a number of questions after each set of a task and at the end of the pre-
test VHVVLRQHJRQDVFDOHRIWR³KRZGLIILFXOWGLG\RXILQGWKHWDVN´³KRZ
                                                          
28
 :HGRQRWILQGDQ\GLIIHUHQFHLQWKHDQVZHUVRIVXEMHFWVWRWKHTXHVWLRQV³KRZKDUGGLG\RX
WU\´DQG³KRZIRFXVHGZHUH\RXRQDWDVN´DFURVVLQFHQWLYHOHYHOV either, indicating subjects 
did not consciously exert effort level depending on the rewards they would get. 
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PXFKGLGOXFNRUVNLOOGHWHUPLQH\RXUSHUIRUPDQFHLQWKHVHW´:HGRQRWILQG
any gender differences neither in performance (Wilcoxon ranksum p=0.125), 
nor in response times (p=0.587) nor in perceptions (p=0.214).  
Results of the pre-test convinced us that this task could be usefully employed to 
study confidence. In particular, we concluded that 
i) incentives play no role in performance, 
ii) learning effects are absent, 
iii) there are no gender differences. 
These conditions attested that the task was more skill than effort task and can 
be further used in studies interested in measuring behaviour relating to 
individual abilities.  
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Appendix B: Instructions 
Welcome! You are about to participate in an experiment.  There are 16 people 
participating in the experiment. You must not communicate with anyone. If you 
have a question at any time during the experiment, please raise your hand and 
someone will come to your desk to answer it. 
The use of electronic devices such as mobile phones, music players, and tablet 
computers is strictly prohibited. Please make sure that all such devices are 
turned off and put away out of sight.  
If you break these rules, you will be excluded from the experiment without 
receiving any payment and be disqualified from future experiments with 
CeDEx.  
,I\RXDJUHHWRWKHVHWHUPVSOHDVHSUHVVWKH³1H[W´EXWWRQDQGSURFHHGWRWKH
Instructions. 
 
In this experiment you will complete the Circle task. In this task you will see a 
pair of circles on your screen for 1 second.  One of the circles contains 50 dots 
and the other contains 70 dots. After the circles disappear from your screen, you 
will be asked to judge whether the right or the left circle contained more dots. 
<RX KDYH WR LQGLFDWH \RXU MXGJHPHQW E\ SUHVVLQJ RQ WKH ³/HIW´ RU ³5LJKW´
button. When you press the button of your choice, you will move to the next 
pair of circles.  
To acquaint you with the task, you can practice the task by pressing START 
THE PRACTICE button. You will practice one set of 20 tasks. The practice set 
will not affect your final outcome. You can start the practice when you are 
ready. We will give you more information about the experiment, when you 
finish the practice set.  
 
Instructions:  
There are 3 stages in this experiment.  At each stage, the participants will be 
divided into groups of 4. At each stage, you will complete the Circle task and 
receive a score based on your performance. You will complete one set of 20 
pairs of circles and score 1 point for each correct answer, so you can score up 
to 20 points. Similarly, each other group member will complete the Circle task, 
seeing an identical set of circles, scoring 1 point for each correct answer, and so 
scoring up to 20 points. 
 
 
START THE PRACTICE 
Next 
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Stage 1: 
In Stage 1, you will be randomly matched with 3 other participants to form a 
group.  There will be four groups: Group A, Group B, Group C and Group D. 
You will see which group you are in on your screens. 
 
 
In Stage 2, you will be placed in a new group according to your scores in Stage 
1.  
x The top two scorers of Group A will be matched with the top two scorers 
of Group B to form the Group AB_Top.  
x The top two scorers of Group C will be matched with the top two scorers 
of Group D to form the Group CD_Top.   
x The bottom two scorers of Group A will be matched with the bottom 
two scorers of Group B to form the Group AB_Bottom.  
x The bottom two scorers of Group C will be matched with the bottom 
two scorers of Group D to form the Group CD_Bottom. 
Ties will be randomly broken.  
 
 
Stage 3: 
In Stage 3, you will be placed in a new group according to your scores in Stage 
2.  
x The top two scorers of Group AB_Top will be matched with the top two 
scorers of Group CD_Top to form the Group ABCD_TopTop.  
x The bottom two scorers of Group AB_Top will be matched with the 
bottom two scorers of Group CD_Top to form the Group 
ABCD_TopBottom.  
Stage 
1:  
Group A: 
4 participants 
Group B:  
4 Participants 
Group C: 
4 participants 
Group D: 
4Participants 
Stage 
2:  
Group AB_Top: 
2 highest scorers of Group A  
and 2 highest scorers of Group B 
 
 
Group CD_Top: 
2 highest scorers of Group C  
and 2 highest scorers of Group D 
Stage 
1:  
Group A: 
4 participants 
Group B:  
4 Participants 
Group C: 
4 participants 
Group D: 
4Participants 
Stage 
2: 
Group AB_Bottom:   
2 lowest scorers of  Group A  
and 2 lowest scorers of Group B 
Group CD_Bottom:   
2 lowest scorers of  Group C  
and 2 lowest scorers of Group D 
Back Stage 3 Instructions 
Back Stage 2 Instructions 
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x The top two scorers of AB_Bottom will be matched with the top two 
scorers of Group CD_Bottom to form the Group ABCD_BottomTop.   
x The bottom two scorers of the Group AB_Bottom will be matched with 
the bottom two scorers of Group CD_Bottom to form the Group 
ABCD_BottomBottom.  
 
 
 
At each stage you will be informed of which group you are in. You will have to 
do two things: fill out a table as below and then complete the Circle task 
Table: 
For every row of the table you must make a choice between Option A and 
Option B. You should consider which of these two options you would prefer to 
have for each row then mark your choice by ticking the circle corresponding to 
your preferred option. In each table, we ask that you start with the top row and 
work your way down the rows. Option A will pay off £10 if you are one of the 
top two scorers of your group in this stage and £3 if you are one of the bottom 
two scorers of your group in this stage. (You will complete the Circle task and 
 
 
Stage 3: 
Group ABCD_TopTop: 2 highest scorers of the Group AB_Top  
and 2 highest scorers of the Group CD_Top 
 
Group ABCD_TopBottom: 2 lowest scorers of the Group AB_Top 
and 2 lowest scorers of the Group CD_Top 
 
Stage 2:  
Group AB_Top: 2 highest scorers 
of Group A and 2 highest scorers 
of Group B 
Group CD_Top: 2 highest 
scorers of Group C and 2 
highest scorers of Group D 
 
Stage 1:  
Group A: 
4 participants 
Group B:  
4 Participants 
Group C: 
4 participants 
Group D: 
4Participants 
 
Stage 2: 
Group AB_Bottom:  
2 lowest scorers of Group A  
and 2 lowest scorers of Group B 
Group CD_Bottom: 2 lowest 
scorers of Group C and 2 
lowest scorers of Group D 
 
Group ABCD_BottomTop: 2 highest scorers of the Group 
AB_Bottom and 2 highest scorers of the Group CD_Bottom 
Stage 3: 
 
 
Group ABCD_BottomBottom: 2 lowest scorers of the Group 
AB_Bottom and 2 lowest scorers of the Group_CD_Bottom 
Back Next 
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find out if you are in the top two or bottom two after you have filled the 
table.)Option B is a lottery which will pay off £10 or £3 with the chance of £10 
progressively decreasing as you move down the rows. Since the chance of 
winning £10 for Option B in the first row is 100%, we think that you will want 
to choose Option B in the first row. But, since Option B gets progressively 
worse as you move down the rows (while Option A stays exactly the same), 
there may come a row where the chance of winning £10 of Option B is 
sufficiently small, that you prefer Option A. If you find such a row, you should 
then choose Option A for that row and the rows below it (since Option B 
continues to get worse all the way down the table). 
 
Circle Task 
After you have completed the table you will complete the Circle task. You will 
have 20 tasks to complete similar to the practice set. After everyone has 
completed the task, your scores will be calculated. For each correct answer, 1 
point will be added to your score so that you can score up to 20 points. Your 
score will be compared to the scores of the other members of your group and at 
the end of the stage you will be informed of whether you were in the TOP or 
BOTTOM two of your group for that stage. Ties will be randomly broken. You 
will then be assigned to a new group according to your performance, as 
explained above, and the next stage will begin. 
Payment: 
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At the end of the session, a 6-sided die will be rolled. Depending on the 
outcome, you will be paid based on one of the stages and either the table or your 
performance in the Circle task. 
Roll Paid according to: 
1 Stage 1 ± Table 
2 Stage 1 ± Circle 
3 Stage 2 ± Table 
4 Stage 2 ±  Circle 
5 Stage 3 ±Table 
6 Stage 3 ± Circle 
 
If a table is selected, a 20-sided die will be rolled to select a row of that table 
and you will be paid according to your choices on the selected row. If you have 
chosen Option B on the selected row, you will play out the lottery of the selected 
row. If you have chosen Option A on the selected row, you will be paid £10 if 
you were in the top two of your group and £3 if you were in the bottom two of 
your group according to your scores in the selected stage. If Circle task is 
selected, you will get £0.50 for each correct answer so that you can earn up to 
£10.  
This payment structure has been designed so that you have an incentive to do 
your best in the Circle task and to think carefully about each and every choice 
you have to make in the Table.  
If you have read and understood the instructions you may start the experiment. 
You may press the Back button to go back and read the instructions once more. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and someone will come to 
your desk to answer it.  
 
 
 
 
  
Back 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this thesis, we have reported three studies that use laboratory experiments to 
investigate different topics in the field of behavioural and experimental 
economics. In one of the studies (reported in chapter 2) we have explored the 
relationship between absolute confidence levels and individual risk attitudes. 
The two other studies included in this thesis (reported in chapters 3 and 4) 
studied relative confidence in competitive environments. 
In Chapter 2, we looked at two potential ways in which risk attitudes 
may affect measured confidence levels. In the first, we investigated whether 
individual risk attitudes, more specifically whether attitudes to consequences or 
to probabilities, were related to self-reported confidence levels. We replicated 
previous findings of a hard-easy effect where subjects underestimate their 
success in easy and overestimate their success in difficult tasks (Fischoff, Slovic 
& Lichtenstein 1977; Lichtenstein & Fischoff 1981) using a self-reported 
elicitation procedure. We found strong association between individual risk 
attitudes and self-reported confidence. Specifically, individuals who are more 
risk averse (based on curvature of a best fitting EU function) or more pessimistic 
(based on best fitting estimates of their RDU probability weighting function) 
tend to express lower confidence.  
In the second, we investigated how risk attitudes affect confidence 
elicited through incentivized device where confidence was inferred from 
choices subjects made. With our new incentivized elicitation procedure, the 
inferred confidence exhibited general level of underconfidence, which has also 
been found in more recent experimental economics literature that has used 
incentives to elicit confidence (e.g. Blavatskyy 2009; Clark & Friesen 2009). 
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Only when we corrected for individual risk attitudes, observed underconfidence 
decreased and confidence became better calibrated.  
In Chapter 3, we studied how information affected entry decisions in 
experimental market entry games. In these games, market entrants receive a 
payoff that depends on a ranking that is determined either randomly or by their 
scores in a trivia quiz. Camerer & Lovallo (1999) and Moore & Cain (2007) 
have shown that individuals overenter markets with a simple quiz and 
underenter markets with a difficult quiz and explain this pattern by relative 
confidence. We asked whether implicit information through individuals 
deciding in a group or explicit information through provision of historical 
average performance information affects entry patterns to simple and difficult 
markets. :H UHSOLFDWHG 0RRUH 	 &DLQ¶V H[SHULPHQWDO GHVLJQ DV RQH RI WKH
treatments and added two between-subject information manipulation treatments 
to study this research question. We hypothesized that groups could serve as 
implicit information channels, in that interaction between group members 
would result in groups possessing PRUHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWRWKHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHV
than individuals. We found that when information was implicit via group 
decision making, groups predicted RWKHUV¶ HQWU\EHKDYLRXUDQGSHUIRUPDQFHV 
more accurately than individuals. However, in spite of this, groups exhibited a 
similar bias in entry to individuals and the bias was not mitigated through 
repetition and feedback. Giving explicit average historical performance 
information, we observed a lower degree of difference in entry between simple 
and difficult markets, which was completely eliminated in the second half of 
the experiment. In this treatment, we also observed the bias in confidence 
disappeared in the second half of the experiment.  
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In Chapter 4, we investigated whether relative confidence snowballs as 
subjects move up or down a hierarchical tournament ladder. The previous 
literature has studied confidence mostly within the context of single stage 
tournaments and contests (Niederle & Vesterlund 2007; Moore & Cain 2007; 
Ludwig, Wickhardt & Wickhorst 2011) but has not looked how confidence 
evolves through stages of a tournament. We considered two between-subject 
treatment conditions, where a task was either very easy or very difficult and 
elicited confidence using a novel incentivized elicitation tool. We found that 
confidence was well calibrated in the first stage of the tournament; on average 
subjects assigned 50% to being in the top half of their groups in the difficult 
treatment and were mildly overconfident in the easy treatment. As subjects 
progressed to the next stages of the tournament, their confidence snowballed. 
Top scorers, who received positive feedback in the previous stage, assigned 
higher probability to being in the top half and the bottom scorers, who receive 
negative feedback in the previous stage, assigned lower probability to being in 
the top half of their new groups. We also found an asymmetric pattern of 
snowballing: top scorers changed their confidence upwards more consistently 
than bottom scorers did downwards. We also identified an interesting bias in 
causal attribution of successes and failures between top and bottom scorers, 
such that top scorers rated the task more as a skill than a luck task. Further 
investigation showed that this bias waVPDLQO\GXHWRPDOHV¶ratings of the task 
UDWKHUWKDQIHPDOHV¶   
While we present novel and stimulating evidence of causal and 
correlational relationships that affect confidence (risk attitudes, information, 
feedback), there are many other potential relationships that could be considered 
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to affect confidence. In our first paper presented in the Chapter 2, we find a 
positive and significant association between risk attitudes and elicited 
confidence, and identify parameters of utility and probability weighting 
functions that affect confidence. Given that probability weighting does appear 
WR LQIOXHQFH FRQILGHQFH MXGJHPHQWV LW LV QDWXUDO WR DVN ZKHWKHU RWKHU µQRQ-
VWDQGDUG¶DVSHFWVRISUHIHUHQFH LQUHODWLRQ WRULVNRUXQFHUWDLQW\PLJKWDIIHFW
confidence judgements. In this respect, an obvious candidate to consider is 
ambiguity aversion, particularly since confidence judgments appear to be 
intrinsically ambiguous (as opposed to risky). Further research could seek to 
investigate whether ambiguity attitudes about uncertain events are related to 
confidence judgements subjects make about their own performance.  
In the last paper of the dissertation, we present compelling evidence of 
confidence snowballing in the hierarchical tournament setting. Further research 
on confidence snowballing might look in more detail at the interaction between 
group formation and snowballing. For example, one could explore whether 
VXEMHFWV¶confidence snowballs when subjects receive feedback about their own 
relative performance in the previous stage but are randomly grouped with other 
subjects in the subsequent stage. In this case, subjects have information about 
themselves but no information about the reference group they are competing 
against. Comparing the snowballing of confidence from one stage to the next in 
this condition with that observed in chapter 4 would enable one to identify the 
extent of reference group neglect where either subjects completely neglect 
competition (the snowballing of confidence is identical across two studies) or 
they only underweight competition (the snowballing is stronger in the randomly 
grouped study). This will further test the robustness of the reference group 
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neglect hypothesis against the differential information hypothesis as possible 
psychological mechanisms explaining biases in relative confidence judgements 
and competitive decision making.  
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